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Executive Summary 
 
Economic Analysis 
 
British Charges for interconnectors and completion of the EU single market in electricity: 
• UK network charges applied to interconnectors create, in general, pancaking 
problems and cross-border inefficiencies such as:  
o Limitation of competition in the internal market 
o Restriction of efficient cross-border transactions 
o Increase of implementation costs on market integration 
o Distortion of interconnection investment incentives 
• The Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges, as well as most part of 
Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges (excluding internal congestion 
costs), aim to recover UK (network and operation) fixed cost. Applying them to 
(hourly) cross-border transactions implies pancaking problems and an inefficient 
outcome.  
• Applying the part of BSUoS charges corresponding to (variable) internal congestion 
costs to interconnectors would be justified economically only if these charges are 
properly implemented, i.e. if they are cost reflective with respect to cross-border 
transactions. Current BSUoS charges are not cost-reflective because they do not 
represent the supplementary cost of national balancing services due to a specific 
transaction. Therefore they do not give efficient signal to cross-border transactions.  
• Losses ‘charges’ related to UK national system losses also create pancaking problems 
and could not be totally justified by an economic rationale; they have no locational 
component and do not represent the supplementary cost of national losses costs due 
to a specific cross-border transaction. To the opposite, losses ‘charges’ related to 
interconnector losses are rationally applied and do not create pancaking problems. 
 
British Charges for interconnectors, compensation and harmonization issues: 
• A workable EU internal electricity market can only be achieved if compensation and 
harmonization issues among TSOs are solved. 
• The Inter-TSO compensation mechanism and the harmonization guidelines are an 
important step forward. However, they not all address comprehensively 
compensation and harmonization issues.  
• As a result, there could be a case for charging interconnector users to ensure 
compensation and harmonization between NGET and Tennet. 
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• However, the existing charging system implemented unilaterally by NGET to tackle 
compensation or harmonization problems are far to be efficient and effective 
because: 
o It creates pancaking problems and cross-border inefficiencies 
o It creates automatic compensation even when compensation is not needed. 
When compensation is needed, charges are usually not cost-reflective 
o It does not solve the harmonization problem in the European interest 
• In conclusion, compensation and harmonization issues naturally call for 
comprehensive and EU-wide solutions. From an economic point of view, unsolved 
issues should be tackled by improving current EU instruments and not by charging 
cross-border transactions. 
 
Legal Analysis 
 
British Charges for interconnectors and sector-specific legislation: 
 
• The UK charges system as imposed to date on interconnectors does not comply with 
the sector specific legislation. 
• Inter-TSO compensation and tariff harmonization is regulated at EU level by 
Regulation (EC) 714/2009 (respectively Regulation (EC) 1228/2003) on cross-border 
exchanges and the new implementing guidelines (Regulation 838/2010). 
• Regulation 714/2009 provides for two complementary mechanisms: 
o compulsory inter-TSO compensation (ITC) scheme covering (real) costs 
incurred from hosting cross-border flows (Art 13)  
o harmonization of national tariffs to avoid trade distortions (Art 14); charges 
to be burn by producers and consumers.  
• EU legislation categorizes interconnectors unambiguously as interfaces connecting 
national transmission systems. Since they are thus neither considered as producers 
nor as consumers they are not addressee of Art 14. As a consequence the charges 
NGET imposes cannot be justified on the basis of this provision. 
• Compensation then can only be achieved under Art 13. The fact that the new binding 
ITC mechanism does not cover compensation of all costs NGET recovers through 
TNUoS/BSUoS charges does not allow for the unilateral imposition of compensation 
and thus circumventing the only relevant Art 13.   
• The desired extended coverage of the ITC mechanism (providing for the recovery of 
those costs NGET recovers to date with the TNUoS/BSUoS charges) can only 
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happen by means of new Art. 18 guidelines. The unilateral imposition by NGET runs 
counter the sector specific legislation.   
 
 
 
British Charges for interconnectors under EU competition law 
 
• NGET as a dominant undertaking has a special responsibility under EU competition 
law vis-à-vis (i) the competition process in downstream markets and (ii) the 
completion of the single market in general. 
• NGET is responsible under EU competition law for the competition effects of the UK 
charging system. 
• NGET abuses his dominant position because the UK charging system creates 
inequality between different network users and because NGET solves an internal 
problem to the detriment of the completion of the single market. 
• Economic or non-economic nature reasons cannot objectively justify the abuse. 
• The analysis pursued under alternative legal bases (essentially free movement) yields 
the same result. 
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Introduction 
BritNed is a joint venture between National Grid and TenneT. Its goal is the construction 
and operation of an electricity DC cable between Great Britain (Isle of Grain, Kent) and 
the Netherlands (Maasvlakte, near Rotterdam, see figure 1). The cable is under 
construction. It is meant to be operational by 2011 with a capacity of 1,000 MW and a 
length of 260 km. The cost of the project has been estimated at €600 million. 
Benefits are expected for both British and Dutch consumers by supporting security of 
electricity supply in both markets and by allowing customers to participate in European 
markets. Power will be transmitted in both directions driven by price differentials and 
demand patterns between the two power markets. The linkage is expected to facilitate 
competition and contribute to the creation of the European Internal Electricity Market 
(IEM). 
BritNed will be a “merchant” interconnector, funded and operated independently by 
National Grid and TenneT. Customers will have open access to the capacity via a 
combination of 'implicit' auctions facilitated by APX, and short term 'explicit' auctions. 
 
Figure 1: BritNed Cable 
 
Source: BritNed 
 
Under the current tariff systems in place in the UK and the Netherlands, BritNed and its 
users will be treated differently on the British and the Dutch sides. The cable connects 
two national networks managed by two different Transmission System Operators (TSOs). 
As a result, NGET (the UK transmission subsidiary of National Grid in charge of the GB 
transmission network) applies the British tariff regime whereas Tennet (TSO of the Dutch 
transmission network) applies the Dutch one. One of the particularities of the British 
regime is that interconnectors are considered as any other UK generator or consumer for 
the purpose of compensating NGET for the use of the transmission system and system 
operation services. Conversely, under the Dutch regime interconnectors are understood as 
part of the network. Accordingly, interconnector owners or users are not charged for 
using the Tennet network. 
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The UK electricity network charges regime is currently under review. The aim of this 
report is to provide an economic and a legal analysis of the existing charging system. It 
aims to answer the following questions: 1) Are UK charges applied to BritNed impairing 
the EU internal market efficiency? 2) Are UK charges applied to BritNed an efficient 
solution to tackle problems of harmonization and compensation in the EU internal 
market? 3) Is the UK charges regime compatible with the EU sector specific legislation? 
4) Could the imposition of BSUoS charges on interconnectors by NGET be considered an 
abuse of a dominant position?  
The analysis focuses on the BritNed interconnector. However some part of it might be 
extrapolated to other UK interconnectors (i.e., current interconnectors as Moyle North 
Ireland-Scotland and IFA UK-France or projected ones such as East-West interconnector 
Eire-Wales). 
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Part A: Economic Analysis 
 
1. UK charges on interconnectors: cross-border efficiency 
analysis1 
Starting with the first European Electricity Directive (96/92/EC), enormous effort has 
been made to achieve a workable and efficient IEM. Ensuring its economic efficiency 
implies the eventual elimination (or reduction) of all kinds of cross-border trade barriers. 
Under the UK network tariff regime interconnectors are considered as any other UK 
generator or consumer. The main rationale behind such assumption is the compensation 
of NGET for the use of the transmission system and system operation services. Such 
charging practices could create cross-border trade barriers and inefficiencies. This section 
analyzes the impact of the British charging practice on cross border efficiency. 
Network users’ charges under the current British regime are:2 
• Connection charges that recover the (one time) cost of connection of a new facility 
(in 2009/2010, these charges represented around £140M), 
• Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges that recover the cost of 
installing and maintaining transmission assets (in 2009/2010, these charges 
represented around £1600M), 
• Balancing Services Use of System (BSUoS) charges that recover the cost of 
operating and balancing the transmission system (in 2009/2010, these charges 
represented around £1000M), and, 
• System losses charges3 that allow for the cost of energy lost in the transmission (in 
2009/2010) to be recovered, these costs represented around £300M).  
This report focuses on TNUoS, BSUoS and losses charges since these charges cover the 
most important part of the network cost and are continuously applied to network users.4   
                                                
1 We focus here on cross-border efficiency which is in line with the EU goal of creating a 
workable Internal Electricity Market. Transmission tariff regimes also have an impact on the 
national efficiency of power systems (for instance, giving locational signals to consumers or 
generators). A complete analysis should take into account all these efficiencies.  
2 Cf. National Grid (2010), “Charging Tutorial”, National Grid, Patrick Hynes June 2010, 
(www.nationalgrid.com). For the sake of completeness: interconnectors are also exposed 
somehow to imbalance charges. The imbalance costs are charged to interconnectors as the 
Interconnector Error Administrator in case of capacity shortage where interconnectors need 
to guarantee physical firmness, and for small deviations between commercial and technical 
flows resulting from technical operational limitations on the link. 
3 Strictly speaking there are no system losses “charges” in the British network charges regime 
(cf. section III.4). However the losses regime has similar consequences on network users as 
if it had charges applied by NGET.  
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The starting point for an analysis of the impact of each type of charge on cross-border 
efficiency will be an introduction to one of the main origins of inefficiencies: tariff 
pancaking. 
 
1.1. Tariff Pancaking and its Impact on Efficiency 
If there was a single TSO covering all European networks, there would be a symmetric 
and harmonized transmission pricing system which would ignore political and 
administrative borders. This ideal situation corresponds to the so-called “single system 
paradigm” in which purchasing network access in one Member State provides access to 
all Member States without distorting incentives to trade across borders.5 The actual 
European organization does not correspond to this situation. In fact, each European 
country has its own TSO managing the network and setting tariffs.6 
The “simple” approach for dealing with cross-border trade in a multi-TSOs set-up would 
be to treat each cross-border transaction as a local generator or demand placed at the 
corresponding border node. This approach however leads to network tariff pancaking and 
consequently creates barriers to cross-border trade and economic inefficiencies.7 
Network tariff pancaking occurs when a transmission user is forced to pay separate 
network tariffs for a transaction that crosses two or more interconnected transmission 
systems or TSO zones. In the case of interconnectors, pancaking works in the following 
way: Suppose a hypothetical (and oversimplified) system in which two national 
networks, A and B, have recently been linked by an interconnector, AB (cf. figure 2). 
Suppose that before the coupling, only consumers (loads)8 were charged with 
transmission tariffs and suppose that tariffs were equal to T in both countries (which 
corresponds to perfect harmonization in transmission tariff level and structure). Countries 
A and B decide to apply transmission tariff T also to the interconnector. Since only 
charges for load exist, the interconnector will be charged only when it takes power from 
one of the systems, i.e. only export transactions (A to B and B to A) are subject to 
interconnector tariff T. Additionally, when comparing national and cross border 
                                                                                                                                
4 TNUoS charges are applied to interconnector owners whereas BSUoS charges and losses 
‘charges’ are applied to interconnector users. However, as interconnector owners pass-
through TNUoS to users, the three types of charges create similar effects (see section III.2).   
5 See for instance, Pérez-Arriaga, I.J. (2002), “Cross-border tarification in the internal 
electricity market of the European Union” in Proc. 14th PSCC, Sevilla, Spain, June 24–28, 
2002; or Pérez-Arriaga, I.J. (2008), “Transmission issues in cross-border trading of electricity. 
Internal compensation charges in the EU”, Presentation at the Energy Policy research 
Seminar of KSG Harvard. 
6 Some countries have several TSOs (e.g., Germany). 
7 Cf. Brunekreeft, G., Neuhoff, K. And Newbery, D., (2005). “Electricity Transmission: An 
Overview of the Current Debate,” Utilities Policy, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June 2005;  
Joskow P., (2005), “Transmission Policy in the United States” Utilities Policy vol. 13( 2), 
June 2005, Pages 95-115. 
8 Note that the same conclusions would apply if all the costs were allocated to generators. 
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transactions, we see that the tariff applying to cross-border transactions (now 2T – 
because T is applied once on export from one country and once on load in the other 
country) is twice the tariff applying to national transactions (T). 
 
Figure 2: Transmission Tariff Pancaking 
 
 
Eliminating the pancaking phenomenon has been a major goal in achieving regional 
electricity market integration in many places over the world.9 Pancaking creates four 
types of economic distortions with the corresponding cross-border inefficiencies: (i) 
limitation of competition in the internal market, (ii) restriction of efficient cross-border 
transactions, (iii) in implementation costs on market integration platforms and (iv) 
distortion of interconnection investment incentives increase. 
• Limitation of competition in the internal market. Pancaking makes it more expensive 
to trade across borders and thereby limits competition. Consider generator GA selling 
to load CA in country A while generator GB sells to load CB in country B (figure 2). 
With this arrangement, both pay transmission charges for only one country, which 
amounts to T. Under a pancaked charging system, if generator GA sells to load CB 
and generator GB sells to load CA, they will both have to pay an additional charge of 
T. Since generators produce the same amount of power (assuming the transactions 
were for the same amount) and since loads consume the same amount of power, the 
entire physical activity of the system remains unchanged. The same power will flow 
                                                
9 This was notably the case for the creation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) 
in the United States and for the integration of European regional electricity markets. Cf. 
Hogan W., (1999). “Market-Based Transmission Investments and Competitive Electricity 
Markets”, mimeo; Costello K., & Burns R., (2000). “Regional Transmission Organizations 
and the coordination of regional electricity markets: a review of FERC order 2000”, report; 
FERC (1999). “Regional Transmission Organizations”, Order No. 2000, Docket No. RM99-
2-000, 1999; Perez-Arriga I., (2002). “Cross-border tarification in the internal electricity 
market of the European union,” in Proc. 14th PSCC, Sevilla, Spain, June 24–28, 2002; 
NERA (2004). “Review of GB-Wide Transmission pricing” A Report for Scottish Power 
UK Division, 26 July 2004. 
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through the same lines. The result of the additional charge is a reduced competition. 
If there is only one electricity generation company in country A with marginal cost 
X, this company can raise its price at least to X+T before the generator in country B 
can start competing.10 Note that high regional competition is crucial for an efficient 
EU electricity market given that national markets are highly concentrated.11 
• Restriction of efficient cross-border transactions. Efficient cross-border transactions 
should be driven exclusively by the energy marginal cost and the price differential 
between the two borders. Of course, this includes the (opportunity) cost of cross-
border capacity if the interconnector is congested. In order to ensure short term 
efficiency (i.e. to minimize total production cost and maximize consumers surplus), 
costs other than the short term marginal cost of using the system should not have any 
influence on the short term decisions. Allocating transmission charges to the 
interconnector would imply an artificial transaction cost and would limit the 
opportunities of having beneficial trades taking place. 
• Increase in implementation costs on market integration platforms. It is well-known 
that implicit auctions design (i.e., market coupling) has better economic properties 
than explicit auctions or administrative mechanisms (e.g. pro-rata, etc.).12 Applying 
transmission charges to the interconnector can make implicit auctions 
implementation harder. Firstly, within an implicit auction framework it is not 
possible to identify the auction participants who are “using” the interconnector 
(internal energy transactions and cross-border transactions are settled at the same 
time). Secondly, the inclusion of related (flow) interconnector charges in the implicit 
auction algorithm is far from being simple. Ad hoc solutions have to be implemented, 
leading to potential distortions. Moreover, algorithm solutions are more complex 
when the market coupling includes different interconnectors with different 
transmission network tariffs (e.g., market coupling between FR-BE-NL and UK). 
These implementation difficulties may create a barrier for the implementation of 
efficient solutions to achieve market integration with the corresponding economic 
efficiencies. 
• Distortion of interconnection investment incentives. Applying transmission charges to 
an interconnector reduces the incentives to invest in new interconnection capacity. 
Indeed, this would lower the economic interest that investors and, more broadly, the 
EU community have in the interconnector, possibly to a point where the project 
would no longer be profitable. 
                                                
10 Cf. Stoft S., (1998). “MW-Mile Charges: Do They Work?”, Working Paper ; Pierce R., 
Trebilcock M, and Thomas E., (2005). “Regional Electricity Market Integration: A 
Comparative Perspective.” Working Paper. 
11 Cf. Smeers Y., (2009). “How well can one measure market power in restructured electricity 
systems?”, In: Electricity Reform in Europe, ed. J-M Glachant and F. Lévêque, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2009. 
12 Cf. Smeers Y., Ehrenmann A., (2005). “Inefficiencies in European congestion 
management proposals,” Utilities Policy 13(2), 135-152 (2005). 
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Most of the costs recovered via transmission tariff are fixed costs. Since the system 
operator needs to ensure total recovery of costs, network users have to pay for fixed 
costs. In order to do so while minimizing distortions with respect to the first best 
economic equilibrium (the “efficient outcome”), the economic theory recommends 
charging fixed costs to the least price-elastic players (i.e. certain consumers).13 
Interconnector users or parties involved in cross-border transactions are very elastic to 
prices and costs and should therefore be the ones paying the smallest part of the costs (i.e. 
a share proportional to the inverse of their price elasticity)14. This implies that 
transmission tariffs should not be transaction-based. More generally, it would be justified 
to have transmission tariffs dependent on the connection point to the network, on the 
nature of the agent (producer or consumer), on the amount of power injected or retrieved 
from the network and on the time of injection or withdrawal, but not on the commercial 
transactions made cross-border. Said differently, agents making cross-border transactions 
and agents making internal transactions should be treated in the same way in order to 
avoid distortions and inefficiencies. 
To sum up, network tariff pancaking creates barriers to cross-border trade and economic 
inefficiencies. In the following sub-sections, we analyze how the UK charges applied to 
interconnectors create pancaking problems and inefficiencies. 
 
1.2. TNUoS Charges 
What are TNUoS charges? 
TNUoS charges reflect the cost of installing and maintaining the transmission system for 
the Transmission Owner (TO), being NGET. That TO activity is undertaken to allow the 
flow of power between connection sites and to provide transmission system security.  
The main goal of TNUoS is to collect the fixed costs of the transmission system and to 
give long term locational signals to generation and demand.15 TNUoS charges are 
calculated annually and should completely cover NGET total allowed revenue for the TO 
activity. NGET TO allowed revenues for the period 2007 to 2012 have been defined in 
the Transmission Price Control Review (TPCR4).16 The allowed revenues were around 
£1300M for 2007/2008, around £1400M for 2008/2009 and around £1600M for 
2009/2010. The important increase in allowed revenues is explained by the increase in 
transmission network investments made by NGET. 
UK TNUoS tariffs are applied to three types of transmission users: (i) generators, (ii) 
consumers and (iii) interconnector owners. In terms of tariff application, interconnectors 
                                                
13 Cf. Ramsey, F. (1927). A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, Economic Journal, 37, 
pp. 47-61. 
14 Cf. Pérez-Arriaga I., Smeers Y. (2003). “Guidelines on tariff setting” in Transport Pricing 
of Electricity Networks, (ed. François Lévêque).   
15 Cf. National Grid (2010), “Charging Tutorial”, National Grid, Patrick Hynes June 2010, 
(www.nationalgrid.com). 
16 Cf. www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/Archive/TPCR4/Pages/TPCR4.aspx  
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are considered as generators in importing situations (i.e., flows going into UK) and as 
consumers in exporting situations (i.e., flows leaving UK). TNUoS tariffs are usually 
passed-through to the interconnector users (i.e., users who buy cross-border 
interconnector capacity such as generators, consumers, suppliers, traders, etc.). The 
TNUoS charge is split with a ratio 27:73 respectively between users exporting onto the 
system (Generators/Interconnectors importing) and users importing from it 
(Suppliers/Interconnectors exporting). 
The basis of charging to recover the allowed revenues is the Investment Cost Related 
Pricing (ICRP) methodology.17 This model computes network long-run marginal cost for 
each zone and allows integration of a locational signal in the tariff, reflecting whether the 
generation/load contributes to or alleviates the need for additional transmission 
investment. Long-run marginal cost is adjusted twice, first to ensure that charges allow 
total network costs to be recovered and second to ensure that the tariff recovers 73% of 
cost from demand and 27% from generation. Indeed, without the adjustment, the 
locational element (marginal cost) would only account for approximately 20% of TNUoS 
needed revenues. 
Network users are charged a zonal charge dependent on which tariff zone they are 
connected to. Zonal tariffs differentiate between two types of usage of the network (i.e., 
generation or demand): 
• Generation TNUoS Charges: There are currently 20 generation TNUoS tariff zones. 
The charges for these zones display a north to south differential and vary from 
positive tariffs in the north to negative tariffs in some southern zones. The basis of 
the generation charge is the highest Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC)18 applicable 
over the year for positive tariff zones, or the average of the three highest metered 
volumes over the winter period for negative tariff zones.  
• Demand TNUoS Charges: There are 14 demand TNUoS tariff zones. The supplier 
TNUoS tariffs display a reverse north to south differential relative to the generation 
tariffs. Suppliers’ charges for (half-hourly) metered demand are based on the average 
of the actual demand supplied during the Triad. The Triad is defined as the three half-
hour settlement periods of highest transmission system demand between November 
and February of a financial year, separated by 10 clear days.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 National Grid (2010), “The Statement of the Use of System Charging Methodology”, 
(www.nationalgrid.com)  
18 The Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC) of a power station is defined as the access 
capacity that the generator has requested to export power into the main transmission system. 
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Figure 3: TNUoS charges (2007) 
 
Source: National Grid 
 
Are TNUoS charges applied to interconnectors creating “panckaking” problems? 
The current UK TNUoS regime creates the same economic problems as “pancaking” 
does. Even though this is a very particular case,19 i.e. that interconnector owners are 
charged with network tariffs only on one side (UK), potential distortions exist and they 
can be substantial. 
Allocating TNUoS charges to the interconnector creates an artificial transaction cost and 
restricts the opportunities for beneficial trades to take place.20 It could be argued that 
TNUoS charges imposed on interconnector owners are flat charges and therefore do not 
play any role in short term decisions (and consequently with short term efficiency). 
However this argument does not hold. Although TNUoS charges have been designed to 
be applied to installed capacity or maximal capacity use of a facility, the impact of these 
tariffs on generators or loads is not the same as their impact on interconnector users. 
Indeed the interconnector owners “pass-through” TNUoS charges to the users (i.e., 
generators, consumers, suppliers, traders, etc). The pass-through to the users is using 
some sharing rule related to bought/sold cross-border capacity or nomination. Thus the 
                                                
19 Moyle cable, linking Scotland and North-Ireland, is an exception. We understand that 
transmission tariffs are applied on both sides of the interconnector. 
20 Bunn D., Zachmann G., (2010). “Inefficient arbitrage in inter-regional electricity 
transmission", Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 243-265, June. 
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short term decisions of interconnector users incorporate this extra cost in their arbitrage 
decisions and this is the source of distortions. 
Concerning the BritNed cable, where the main part of transmission network cost is 
allocated to load in the two interconnected countries (73% UK and 100% the 
Netherlands), the most affected cross-border transactions will be exports from the UK to 
the Netherlands. Cross-border transactions in this direction will account for about half of 
the exchanges between the two countries.21 Under the current TNUoS regime, UK-NL 
cross-border transactions will have to pay additional network tariffs corresponding to 
withdrawals at the interconnector. British and Dutch generators will not compete on 
equal ground and inefficiencies will appear.  
Note that the size of potential inefficiencies could be large. This can be seen when 
looking at the impact of the current regime on the minimal energy price differential 
necessary to make a cross-border transaction happen. Indeed, given the existence of 
TNUoS transaction costs, interconnector users would only perform a cross-border 
transaction if the energy price differential is higher than the transaction cost plus the 
border capacity price. The minimum required price differential in case of a Triad 
warning22 would need to be very high (more than £5,000 per MWh).23 Inefficiencies 
could also arise in NL-UK transactions despite that they would not be as big as for UK-
NL transactions.24 
                                                
21 Historical simulations of hourly flow direction indicate that NL to UK cross-border 
efficient transactions (i.e., those where energy price in NL is higher than energy price in UK) 
represent almost 50% of the hours. Cf. Moss Ian, (2009), “APX-ENDEX, Market Coupling 
& BritNed”, BritNed Connect Seminar, 10th December 2009. 
22 Triad measures maximum demand readings three times a year and uses the average of 
these readings to calculate Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) consumer 
charges. Triad is an ex post mechanism as consumers know the periods corresponding to 
Triad after the fact. In March of each year National Grid publishes the three highest 
maximum demand readings that have occurred between November of the previous year and 
February of the current year. “Triad warnings” indicate to consumers when the probability 
of a Triad is high. Triad mechanisms have been criticized for their lack of predictability 
which can lead to further inefficiencies. Cf. Ofgem (2010), “Electricity interconnector 
policy”, consultation document; National Grid (2010), “Triad and Interconnector Charges”, 
TCMF 27th January 2010 National grid. 
23 Currently, Transmission Network Use of System Demand Charges corresponding to the 
connection point of BritNed cable (South East zone) are about 25.19 £/kW. For a capacity 
of 1000 MW, the yearly total amount (supposing that during Triad interconnector is 
exporting) which has to be recovered is 25,190,000 £/year. Depending on the rule of 
allocation of these costs between the interconnector users, this could represent a minimum 
of 3 £/MWh (if TNUoS are allocated for all capacity in this direction, i.e. 25,190,000 £/1000 
MW * 8760 hours) and a maximum of 8400 £/MWh (if TNUoS cost is allocated within 
users exporting during ex post Triad).  
24 Currently, Transmission Network Use of System Generation Charges corresponding to 
the connection point of BritNed cable (South East zone) are about 1.21 £/kW. For a 
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We have shown that applying TNUoS charges to interconnectors has a negative impact 
on the creation of the IEM. They lead to pancaking problems and create several 
inefficiencies (e.g., limitation of competition in the internal market, restriction of efficient 
cross-border transactions and increase in implementation costs on market integration 
platforms).25  
Following a public consultation by NGET in the summer of 2010, Ofgem has recently 
changed the UK network charges regime: from the implementation date, interconnectors 
will be treated as a separate class of transmission users, distinct from generation or 
demand, and they will be exempted from TNUoS charges.26 
 
1.3. BSUoS Charges 
What are BSUoS charges? 
As GB System Operator, NGET has a responsibility to keep the electricity system in 
balance (energy balancing) and to maintain quality and security of supply (system 
balancing). The Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) sets out how the System 
Operator’s (SO) balancing costs are recovered from network users. The costs incurred by 
the SO for energy and system balancing are charged to all BSC parties (i.e., generators, 
suppliers and interconnector users) via the BSUoS charges.27  
                                                                                                                                
capacity of 1000 MW, the yearly total amount which should be recovered is 1,210,000 
£/year. Depending on the rule of allocation of these costs between the interconnector users, 
this could represent a minimum of 0.14 £/MWh (i.e. 1,210,000 £/1000 MW * 8760 hours) 
and an estimated value of 0.28 £/MWh considering imports of 1000 MW for 50% of the 
time. 
25 It could be argued that charging interconnectors would be justified in order to give long 
term locational signals to optimize the development and the use of the UK national network. 
This argument seems to be weak. Concerning generators and demand locations, it is not 
(theoretically and empirically) clear how long term signals are needed for generation/load 
location in the presence of short term signals (i.e., the difference in electricity prices between 
two countries). Moreover, other factors not related to network tariff or electricity prices are 
also very important in the location of new generators and loads (e.g., water or fuel 
availability, permits, etc.). Finally, concerning new interconnectors, locational issues could be 
treated at the moment of granting the exemption or with connection charges. 
26 Cf. Ofgem (2010), Decision letter in relation to Use of System Charging Methodology 
Proposal GB ECM-26 “Review of interconnector charging arrangements”, October 2010 
(http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=132&refer=Networks/Tr
ans/ElecTransPolicy/Charging) 
27 It is worth noting that BSUoS charges do not include imbalance charges. Indeed, out-of-
balance parties are exposed to imbalance (cash-out) prices designed to reflect the costs of 
energy balancing. Imbalance cash-out rules are designed to provide incentives on parties to 
balance their aggregated input and off-takes from the system on a half-hourly basis, where it 
is cheaper for the parties than for NGET to do so. When NGET balances on behalf of 
parties, those parties should face the costs of NGET’s balancing actions. Hence cash-out 
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They include the actual costs incurred for balancing and securing the system and the costs 
of the SO function. Thus, they have two main components: i) an “internal” BSUoS 
component which includes internal SO costs as staff, building, IT costs, etc. and ii) an 
“external” BSUoS component which includes all the costs of the services used to balance 
and to secure the system (cf. figure 4)28.  
Internal SO costs are quite stable and represent around £100M per year. External SO 
costs are more variable as they depend on the wholesale electricity prices and on network 
conditions (e.g., network constraints). In 2009/2010, these costs were of £807M.29 
External SO costs include two main components: i) “System” balancing costs within the 
balancing mechanism (CSOBM) (which mainly includes system balancing costs not 
covered by imbalance charges)30 and SO balancing costs outside the balancing 
mechanism, which are related to contracts between NGET and market participants 
providing different ancillary services (BSCC). External SO costs are mainly costs 
incurred to resolve transmission constraints, sub-half-hourly imbalances or frequency 
response (which are below the granularity of the settlement rules) and reserves 
availability payments (which cannot be associated with a particular imbalance and 
therefore are not included in the imbalance charges). In 2009/2010 transmission 
constraints accounted for 26 % of total SO external costs (~£206M), frequency response 
accounted for 23% of total SO external costs (~£182M) and reserve procurement 
accounted for 33% of total SO external costs (~£262M). All together, these three cost 
components accounted for over 80% of total external costs (i.e. £650M compared to a 
total of £807M).31  
                                                                                                                                
prices should reflect the costs NGET faces when resolving market wide energy imbalances 
at half-hourly granularity, and out-of-balance parties should be subject to these costs. 
Interconnectors are also exposed somehow to imbalance charges (see footnote 2). 
28 BSUoS charges also include incentive payments/receipts (cf. “An introduction to National 
Grid Electricity Transmission System Operator (SO) Incentives. A Balancing Services 
Incentive Scheme Reference Document”, November 2009, 
http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/EC31124A-8BC5-41AA-A87C-
DA8C949C6E74/39632/BSISReferenceDocument.pdf). 
29 Cf. National Grid (2009), “Historic and Forecast Balancing Services Incentive Scheme 
Costs”, November 2009 (cf.http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/1B6B81A0-7583-
4EC0-B16D-A814E2100546/38603/ElectricitySOIncentivesHistoricForecastCosts.pdf). 
Values correspond to the 2009/2010 latest forecast (total balancing costs). 
30 Given the positive difference between System Buy Price (SBP) for negative imbalance and 
System Sell Price (SSP) for positive imbalance, the aggregated imbalance system normally has 
a positive net cash flow (i.e., the amount of money paid by BRPs for negative imbalances is 
higher than what NGET pays to BRPs for positive imbalances). This cash-flow is named the 
Residual Cash-flow Reallocation Cash-flow (RCRC). It is rebated to all parties on a per 
MWh basis, offsetting the energy balancing component of BSUoS for those parties who are 
in balance. 
31 Other system services costs included in the BSUoS charges are, for instance, the cost of 
the reactive power services, the cost of black start services, etc. 
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Figure 4: Balancing Services Use of System charges 
 
Source: NGET (2007)32 
 
Transmission constraints and reserve procurement costs have increased considerably 
since 2006/2007. Transmission constraints costs have increased from around £100M in 
2006/2007 to £200M in 2009/2010.33 This has been mainly due to transmission 
constraints between England and Wales and Scotland zones (i.e., constraints costs at 
Cheviot boundary increased from £25M to £106M from 2006/2007 to 2009/2010). 
Reserves procurement costs have increased from £152M to £262M. The increase in 
External SO costs has resulted in a considerable increase in BSUoS charges. Table 1 
shows the evolution of BSUoS charges since 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Cf. National Grid (2007), “Transmission Charging Tutorial”, National Grid, 6 December 
2007 (www.nationalgrid.com). 
33 Forecasted values for 2010/2011 indicate that transmission constraints costs will be of 322 
£M. (cf. National Grid (2010), “Balancing Services Incentive Scheme”, David Smith, 
February 2010,  http://www.nationalgrid.com/NR/rdonlyres/03E4B551-1BC1-4F0F-
8CEB-0F932BFAC7AF/39949/Feb2010_Incentives_Scheme.pdf) 
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Table 1: Average BSUoS34 
 Average BSUoS (£/MWh) 
Average BSUoS 
(€/MWh) 
2006-2007 0.95 1.14 
2007-2008 1.00 1.20 
2008-2009 1.50 1.80 
2009-2010 1.54 1.84 
2010-2011 (forecast) 1.62 1.94 
2011-2012 (forecast) 1.92 2.30 
Source: National Grid35 
 
BSUoS charges are applied separately to production (generation or imports from 
interconnectors) and consumption (demand or export to interconnectors) accounts with 
overall charges split 50:50 between generation and demand. BSUoS charges are 
recovered on a per MWh basis based on throughput (i.e., based on their energy taken 
from or supplied to the GB transmission system) and are calculated every settlement 
period (each half-hour). The BSUoS charges do not have any locational component.  
Are the BSUoS charges applied to interconnectors creating “pancaking” problems? 
As mentioned before, BSUoS charges mainly cover national system operator costs, 
national balancing services costs and national network constraints (i.e. internal 
congestion) costs. In most (continental) European countries these costs, often called 
“system services costs”, are usually recovered via network tariffs (or specific system 
services tariffs) applied only to national/native load and/or generators.36 System services 
costs are not charged to interconnector users or to network users located in other TSO 
zones. For instance, a German supplier buying electricity in France has to pay system 
services charges only in Germany and does not have to pay any system charges in France. 
This is in line with the “single system paradigm” which implies that paying national 
network tariffs provides access to the entire EU network and that only national network 
                                                
34 We assume a constant exchange rate of £1=€1.2. 
35 http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Balancing/bsuos/rfpricescharges/ 
36 This needs to be confirmed for UK interconnectors (IFA and Moyle) and their 
corresponding interconnected countries (France, and Ireland). In France, most system 
services costs are covered by network tariffs (TURPE). These tariffs are not applied to 
interconnectors. However, there is a proportional charge in the balancing mechanism of 
around ~0.11€/MWh. This charge is presumably applied to IFA interconnector users. We 
do not have any information on the system charges in Ireland. 
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users have to pay for internal network costs (including system services costs37) (FSR, 
2005)38. 
In this respect, the current UK BSUoS regime creates “pancaking” problems. They occur 
when a network user is forced to pay several system tariffs for a transaction that crosses 
two or more interconnected transmission systems or TSO zones. Indeed, the UK regime 
is charging network users outside the UK with part of the cost of the UK system 
balancing even though these users are already paying for the balancing services costs of 
their own country. This situation, which is different from other continental border ones, 
may be a source of inefficiencies. 
BSUoS charges imposed on interconnector users are limiting cross-border trade and 
competition and are making it more difficult to implement efficient market integration 
solutions (e.g., market coupling with implicit auctions)39. Any charge on the use of the 
interconnector is internalized in the behaviour of market participants when they decide on 
cross-border transactions (i.e., in the bidding process to acquire capacity rights in explicit 
auctions; or in the special rules used in the market coupling algorithm in implicit 
auctions). For instance, a BSUoS charge of 2 €/MWh applied to cross-border transactions 
(imports or exports) implies that each time the energy price spreads between two 
countries (e.g. UK-France or UK-Netherlands) is less than 2 €/MWh, no flow/transaction 
would take place. (See box n° 1 concerning the quantitative assessment of loss of welfare 
due to BSUoS charges).  
More generally, all resulting cross-border transaction volumes are negatively affected by 
BSUoS charges. This impact naturally depends on the level of the charges but also on 
their uncertainties. As BSUoS charges are not known exactly at the time when cross-
border transaction decisions are taken, their impact is even higher. BSUoS charges are ex 
post charges. Since they depend on total injections and off takes, their actual level can 
only be known after taking the cross-border transactions decisions. In case of 
uncertainties, “risk averse” market players overreact and may further reduce their cross-
border transactions. 
 
 
                                                
37 Strictly speaking, this argument is stronger for “synchronized” countries (i.e., sharing the 
same network frequency) often connected with AC lines. Indeed, these countries are really 
sharing ancillary services (mainly primary and secondary reserves) to maintain network 
frequency and stability. However, this concept can also be applied to non synchronized 
countries, i.e. connected by DC cables. Considering the EU wide transmission system as a 
whole network, every sub-system (i.e. national) should ensure its own ancillary services in 
order to support national and EU cross border transactions.  
38 Cf. FSR (2005), “A study on the inter-TSO compensation mechanism”, October 2005 
(http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/FSR/pdf/051031-ITCStudy-
FinalReportCover_000.pdf)  
39 Cf. Moss Ian, (2009), “APX-ENDEX, Market Coupling & BritNed”, BritNed Connect 
Seminar, 10th December 2009.  
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Box 1 – Quantitative assessment of loss of welfare due to BSUoS charges 
 
However, applying these charges to an interconnector could be justified if they are 
directly linked to actual operating costs and are based on a sound economic rationale. It is 
not the case there and we will show that it is not efficient to allocate these charges to 
interconnector users. It supposes answering two questions: (i) can current BSUoS charges 
be justified by the short-term signals they give to exporters/importers? and (ii) are current 
BSUoS charges cost reflective? 
Assessing the loss of welfare due to export/import charges is a difficult task in terms of 
methodology and required data. Two main issues should be considered concerning the impact 
of these charges: i) the impact on cross-border efficient trades and ii) the impact on market 
power and cross-border competition. The methodology and the necessary data are different 
depending on the issues and the related assessment of loss of welfare.  
 
The impact of export/import charges on cross-border efficient trades 
Leaving aside the problem of market power, historical data could be used to estimate the loss 
of welfare provoked by the “non-realization” of efficient cross-border trades. We would 
estimate the loss of value of transactions that were efficient but that have not taken place 
because of the export/import charges. For instance, this will be the case when a cheap 
generation plant is available in one country but its capacity is not exported to the other country 
because of the export/import charges. This would happen when export/import charges are 
higher than the price differential between these neighbour countries. 
 
Complete calculation of these cross-border inefficiencies requires important quantity of data. 
Indeed this assessment needs hourly supply and demand curves for all the involved countries 
and the hourly availability of interconnection capacity for the same period. Hourly electricity 
price data for the different countries could also be used to estimate elasticity and the loss of 
welfare. Without this data, it is impossible for us to estimate precisely the loss of welfare 
provoked by the non-realization of cross-border trades.  
 
It is possible however to make a rough estimate of the loss of welfare making several 
simplifying assumptions. We can suppose that the value of cross-border trades that do not take 
place because of import/export charges corresponds to the loss of welfare. For instance, we can 
roughly estimate the potential loss of welfare of these charges for UK for 2011, with an 
average BSUoS charge of 2 €/MWh. Considering the interconnection capacity of UK of 3.5 
GW (2 GW IFA, 0.5 GW Moyle and 1 GW BritNed), the loss of welfare only due to inefficient 
trade would be around 60M €/year (8760 hours x 2 €/MWh x 3500 MW). Of course this figure 
represents a maximal estimation of the loss of welfare related to the impact of export/import 
charges on cross-border efficient trades. Indeed this estimation makes a key assumption: it 
supposes that price differential is just a bit lower than 2 €/MWh at every hour of the year. In 
fact actual price differential will be sometimes higher and sometimes lower than 2 €/MWh and 
taking into account these both cases would reduce estimation of loss of welfare.        
 
The impact of export/import charges on cross-border competition and market power 
The welfare losses would be considerably higher if we consider the competition effect of cross-
border trade. However a estimation would require the use of an equilibrium market model and 
large amount of detailed data (see for instance Hobbs et al, 2004, “Strategic Generation With 
Conjectured Transmission Price Responses in a Mixed Transmission Pricing System- Part II: 
Application”). 
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Do system services costs included in BSUoS charges depend on cross-border flows? 
As mentioned before, BSUoS charges cover three main types of costs: i) system operator 
internal costs, ii) frequency response & reserves procurement (i.e., availability capacity 
payment) costs, and iii) transmission constraints (i.e., internal congestions) costs. We 
want to analyze here how a marginal cross-border transaction could modify the level of 
each of these costs. 
Firstly, it is clear that the system operator internal costs do not depend on the cross-
border transactions. It is because these costs are essentially staff, building and IT costs 
and they are not related to the level of cross border flows. Thus, charging interconnector 
users for these costs – which represent in the UK around 12% of total balancing charges – 
is not giving any short term efficient signal. 
Secondly, it is similar for frequency response and reserves procurement costs included in 
the BSUoS charges. For the most part, these costs do not depend on the cross-border 
transactions. Frequency response and reserves costs depend on the volume of each type 
of service needed to maintain a certain level of security of the system. Required reserve 
volumes are generally assessed using extreme scenarios (as a very high demand, the 
tripping of the largest power plant or even the tripping of the largest interconnector). 
Thus, the actual hourly level of cross-border transaction has no significant impact on 
these costs. So, charging interconnector users for these costs – which in the UK represent 
around 50% of total balancing charges – is not giving any short term efficient signal.  
Thirdly, congestion costs, representing around 23% of BSUoS charges, may be 
influenced by cross-border transactions. Depending on the interconnection, the direction 
of the flows and the actual network usage in the UK system, a new cross border 
transaction may have a positive or a negative impact on congestion costs. Thus, at first 
glance, we cannot say whether charging interconnector users for these costs would be 
efficient or not. 
In conclusion, we can say that 60% of the BSUoS charges are based on “fixed” costs and 
charging them to interconnector users implies an inefficient outcome.40 For the share of 
BSUoS charges corresponding to internal congestion, the analysis should be deepened. 
The key issue here is to know whether the current BSUoS charging system is giving 
appropriate short term signals (i.e., if they are cost-reflective) to cross border transactions 
in order to make them internalize congestion costs.  
                                                
40 This “fixed cost” argument is only a necessary condition to reject the application of 
charges on interconnector users. Indeed, the system operator needs to ensure total cost 
recovery and therefore network users have to pay for fixed costs. In order to ensure cost 
recovery and to minimize distortions with respect to an efficient outcome (first best), the 
economic theory recommends charging fixed costs to the less elastic players. Interconnector 
users are very elastic to prices and costs and therefore they will then be the ones that should 
pay for the smallest part (an inverse share to their elasticity).  
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Are BSUoS charges cost reflective with respect to transmission constraints? 
The question is whether current BSUoS charges are perfectly reflecting the increase (or 
decrease) in internal congestion costs when there is an extra flow of energy from/to the 
interconnector every half hour. If (the congestion part of) BSUoS charges were cost 
reflective, applying these charges to interconnector users might have a sound economic 
rationale. Indeed, network users would include the negative or positive externalities of 
their decisions for the UK system when deciding on cross-border transactions and would 
make the global outcome more efficient. 
An example of cost reflective national congestion charges is the case when an 
interconnector links two countries and one of them is using an internal zonal pricing (e.g., 
the interconnector between Denmark and Norway). Figure 5 shows an example of such a 
case. Country A is divided in two zones (A1 and A2) and zonal energy prices are 
different when line A12 is congested. The difference between zonal prices (P_A1 and 
P_A2) and the price that would prevail in country A without considering internal 
constraints could be interpreted as if there were locational BSUoS charges.41 Consider for 
instance the situation where there is a surplus of energy in zone A1. The power line A12 
is congested in the direction A1 to A2 and the price at A1 is lower than price at A2. This 
locational price signal (low P_A1) indicates that extra imports (resp. extra exports) to 
zone A1 from the interconnector increase (resp. decrease) the internal congestion costs. 
Cost-reflective charges should be coherent with this zonal pricing mechanism, i.e. 
imports should be charged positively and exports should be charged negatively. The signs 
of the charges should be inversed if the internal congestion is in the other direction (i.e. 
from A2 to A1). 
Figure 5: BSUoS Charges and Zonal Pricing 
 
 
                                                
41 Note that the price in zone A (P_A) resulting if internal constraints were not considered in 
energy pricing (i.e., no zonal pricing) would be between P_A1 and P_A2. So the differences 
between P_A1 and P_A and between P_A2 and P_A act as locational balancing charges. 
Country A 
Interconnector 
AB 
Country B 
Zone A1 
Zone A2 
Line A12
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Are current UK BSUoS charges functioning this way? No. BSUoS charges are not cost 
reflective for at least three reasons: i) BSUoS charges have no locational component, ii) 
BSUoS charges are equal for imports and for exports and iii) BSUoS charges are not 
based on marginal or incremental cost. Firstly, BSUoS charges have no locational 
component and every network user, wherever located, is paying the same charges. 
Applied to interconnector users, the BSUoS current regime entails inefficient short-term 
signals to cross-border transactions. Indeed, for a given settlement period and network 
flow situation, two different cross-border transactions under two different interconnectors 
will pay the same level of charges even if their impact on internal congestion costs is 
completely different (e.g., Moyle cable connected into the Scottish system or IFA cable 
connected into the southern England system). Secondly, for a given interconnector, 
BSUoS charges are equal whatever the direction of the interconnector flow (i.e., imports 
or exports) is. In general, import or export flows will induce opposite effects on internal 
congestion costs, so cost-reflective charges should have different signs. Thirdly, BSUoS 
charges are “average” prices (i.e., for each settlement period they are computed as the 
sum of settlement period cost divided by total injected and off-taken energy). Cost 
reflective charges should be based on marginal or incremental cost. 
In conclusion, our analysis indicates that there is a weak economic rationale in applying 
current UK BSUoS charges to interconnector users. Their application has an insignificant 
effect on minimizing internal system services costs as it limits cross-border competition 
and efficient trade. However, further quantitative analysis would be necessary to 
precisely determine, for each interconnector, how changes in charging rules (i.e. 
exempting interconnector users from BSUoS charges) could affect the level of system 
services costs. 
 
1.4. Losses Costs Charges 
What are the losses costs charged to UK network users? 
The physical process of transferring power across the transmission system implies that 
some of the electrical power is ‘lost’. This lost power is known as “Transmission Losses” 
and typically accounts for about 2 % of the energy transferred across the GB network.42 
The total losses cost depends on the cost of the wholesale electricity in each year. Rough 
estimations indicate that for an electricity price of 50 £/MWh, annual cost related to 
transmission losses is around £300M (50 £/MWh x 6 TWh x 10^6 MWh/TWh). 
                                                
42 Transmission losses consist of two components, fixed and variable. Fixed or “iron” losses 
occur in transformers, overhead lines and cables. Most fixed losses occur in transformers 
where energy is dissipated in the iron core due to the alternating magnetic field. Variable or 
“copper” losses are caused by current flowing through the transmission lines, transformer 
and cables causing them to heat up and dissipate energy. These losses account for most of 
the electricity lost in the Transmission System. They are variable with respect of the volume 
of power transferred and increase with the distance electricity has to travel.  
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Strictly speaking there are no system losses “charges” in the British network charges 
regime. Losses costs in the GB system are recovered by applying loss adjustment factors 
to energy transactions, i.e., network users include the volume of energy corresponding to 
average system losses in their transactions.43 Losses are allocated to Balancing and 
Settlement Code (BSC) parties by scaling the output of generators and the demand 
attributed to suppliers using Transmission Loss Multipliers (TLMs). For instance, to 
schedule a transaction of 100 MWh, the generator and the supplier should correct this 
volume to take into account the losses. A generator TLM of 0.9, for example, means that, 
for 100 MWh of generation, the company would be attributed 90 MWh. Likewise, a 
supplier TLM of 1.1 means that, for 100 MW of actual demand, the supplier would be 
attributed 110 MWh. Total scaling of all generation and demand should exactly recover 
the level of transmission losses. TLMs are set in a way that transmission losses are split 
between generators and suppliers with a ratio of 45:55. 
Losses are currently recovered/allocated on a uniform basis across the country, i.e., there 
are no locational signals.44 However losses are calculated for each settlement period 
which indicates that generators and loads using more the network during period with 
higher losses contribute more. Transmission Loss Multipliers represent average GB 
transmission losses and are set in such a way that all transactions can recover total GB 
transmission losses for each settlement period. 
Interconnection users have a special treatment concerning losses. Interconnection 
transactions are not corrected by variable national average TLM but a fixed loss factor 
representing the actual interconnector losses. For instance, IFA transactions are scheduled 
with respect to mid-channel (the middle of the cable) and they are corrected by a fixed 
loss factor of 1.17 % (this would represent total losses of the cable of 2.34% which 
correspond to real losses on that cable).45 Moyle transactions are corrected by a fixed loss 
factor of 2.26%.46 BritNed transactions are expected to be corrected by a fixed loss factor 
of 4% which corresponds to expected losses on the interconnector.47 
                                                
43 Although NGET is not responsible for “buying” energy for losses on behalf of network 
users as it is typically the case in other countries (e.g., France), it is incentivized to minimize 
the losses volume. Indeed as NGET can reduce losses by modifying the investments or the 
operation of the network behavior, it is incentivized to minimize losses as part of the 
Balancing Services Incentive Scheme. 
44 There have been several attempts to introduce a zonal differentiation of losses allocation. 
However none has succeeded (see for instance Bialek et al. (2005), “Average zonal 
transmission”, http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/~jbialek/AZTL.pdf).  
45 Turvey (2000), “Interconnector Economics: Electricity”,  
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/cri/pubpdf/turvey/Interconnectors.pdf  
46 See AIP (2006), “The Single Electricity Market: Treatment of Transmission Losses”. A 
Consultation Paper, May 2006. 
47 The losses are estimated to about 3.5% of transmitted energy (see BritNed (2009), 
“Questions and Answers from the BritNed Connect Seminars”, www.britned.com)  
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Are losses “charges” applied to interconnectors creating “pancaking” problems? 
UK cross-border transactions are adjusted (or are charged) for losses in two different 
manners: first, for interconnector losses and second, for UK national system losses. These 
losses “charges” have to be analysed separately. 
“Charges” related to interconnectors losses do not seem to create any pancaking 
problems. In fact, interconnector users are duly covering losses incurred in the 
interconnector. If the fixed loss factor applied to interconnector transactions is established 
on the basis of actual interconnector losses, the fixed loss factor represents properly the 
average loss factor on the interconnector, and the current losses allocation mechanism is 
economically sound. For instance, in the case of BritNed, if a trader sells 100 MWh 
delivered in UK (at the arrival of the interconnector), he will have to schedule a 
transaction from the Netherlands to the UK of 104 MWh. The cost of the additional 4 
MWh is paid by the trader. This is economically justified because this represents the cost 
of losses incurred in the interconnector and those losses would not occur if the cross-
border transaction were not realized. As a consequence, if the losses cost to transmit 
energy between the two countries is higher than the expected benefit (i.e., the price 
spread between the two countries) a trader should envisage the transaction, and this is in 
line with welfare maximizing behaviour. 
“Charges” related to UK national system losses create the same type of pancaking 
problems than BSUoS charges. As mentioned before, Transmission Loss Multipliers 
mainly cover national system losses costs. In most (continental) European countries these 
costs are usually recovered via network tariffs applied only to national/native load and/or 
generators. Thus cross-border transactions are paying twice the cost of losses incurred in 
national networks. 
Yet, applying these charges to a cross-border transaction could be justified if they are 
directly linked to actual losses costs and are based on a sound economic rationale. It does 
not seem the case given that losses adjustments are not perfectly cost-reflective. This is 
mainly due to the lack of locational signal in losses adjustments applied to transactions 
which implies that a cross-border transaction that increase UK losses will be pay the 
same that a cross-border transaction reducing UK losses. 
 
1.5. Conclusions of the Cross-border Efficiency Analysis 
In general UK network charges applied to interconnectors create cross-border 
inefficiencies. They lead to pancaking problems and create inefficiencies such as a 
limitation of competition in the internal market, restriction of efficient cross-border 
transactions and increase in implementation costs on market integration platforms).   
Applying TNUoS charges to interconnectors has a negative impact on the creation of a 
single EU electricity market. For BSUoS charges, 60% of these charges are based on 
“fixed” costs and charging them to interconnector users implies an inefficient outcome. 
For BSUoS charges corresponding to internal congestion, the economic rationale in 
applying current UK BSUoS charges to interconnector users is still weak; applying 
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BSUoS charges to interconnector users may only have a very low effect on internal 
system services costs whereas it limits cross-border competition and efficient 
transactions. Losses ‘charges’ related to UK national system losses create pancaking 
problems and could not be totally justified by an economic rationale; they are not 
perfectly cost reflective. On the contrary, losses ‘charges’ related to the interconnector 
losses are rationally applied on interconnectors and do not create any pancaking problem. 
Interconnector users are only covering losses incurred in the interconnector.  
Some UK network charges could be justified if they would bring some real benefits for 
the UK electricity system (for instance, locational signals to generators, load and 
interconnectors). Although a quantitative cost-benefit analysis would be necessary to 
compare potential UK internal benefits with cross-border inefficiencies and costs, we 
have seen that the current UK tariff regime on interconnectors mainly creates barriers 
within the EU IEM and consequently brings inefficiencies that overcome possible 
internal benefits. 
Having seen where the cross-border inefficiencies of current UK tariff regime on 
interconnector are, in the next section, we investigate other possible justifications of this 
charging scheme: compensation and harmonization problems in a multi-TSOs system.  
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2. UK Charges on Interconnectors: Compensation and 
Harmonization Analysis 
 
The “single system paradigm” implies that purchasing network access in one Member 
State provides access to all Member States without distorting incentives to trade across 
borders. This would replicate a situation with a single TSO covering all European 
networks and transmission pricing perfectly harmonized, which ignored political borders.  
As previously stated, the actual European organization does not correspond to this 
situation. In fact, each European country has its own transmission network operated by an 
independent TSO which can set its own tariffs. In this setting with multiple TSOs, there 
are a number of problems compared to the single system paradigm, namely compensation 
and harmonization issues. 
Although these issues between TSOs relate to a problem of fairness (i.e., allocating fixed 
costs), solving these issues is absolutely necessary to ensure a sustainable and workable 
IEM and has important consequences on long-run efficiency. For instance, if 
compensation problems are not solved properly, TSOs/network users losing money will 
refuse to collaborate with the creation of the necessary infrastructure for an integrated 
market. Moreover, the lack of harmonization does not allow a perfect levelised field and 
can distort the long-run competition. 
In this section we analyze compensation and harmonization issues resulting from a 
network managed by several TSOs. We first briefly show three types of related issues 
and the reasons why specific mechanisms are needed to tackle them. The existence of 
these issues calls for regional and comprehensive solutions. This has been the way 
forward chosen in Europe by implementing the EU Inter-TSO compensation (ITC) 
mechanism and tariff harmonization guidelines. In the second part of this section we 
present the current version of the ITC mechanism and harmonization guidelines. 
Although they have not solved all the issues, they have considerably improved the 
situation. Unsolved issues could serve as a basis to justify the application of network 
charges to interconnector users. However in the third part of this section we show why 
this would not be the most effective and efficient solution.  
 
2.1. Compensation and Harmonization Issues in a System with Several TSOs 
In this subsection, we consider three specific situations which exemplify the types of 
issues which can arise with several TSOs. We start with the transit flow example, in 
which a flow of electricity between two countries transits via a third country. The second 
example is related to two neighbouring countries, in a situation where one of them is a 
net exporter to the other and uses part of its transmission network exclusively for 
transmission to clients in this other country. Finally, the last example stresses the issue 
related to the lack of harmonization between network tariff regimes. Note that the two 
first issues refer directly to compensation problems while the third issue, related to 
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harmonization, has only an indirect impact on compensation. In the real world all these 
three problems often appear together. However for pedagogical purposes we present them 
separately. 
The problem of transit flows. 
A transit flow materializes when a power transaction between two countries creates flow 
in a third country.48 The following example shows how transit flows are created and what 
consequences they have in terms of compensation. 
Suppose a hypothetical system where three national networks, A, B and C, are linked 
with the transmissions lines 1 and 2 (cf. Figure 6). Each country owns the section of 
interconnection line which is located on its national territory. In this example, a typical 
flow pattern is a flow from country A to country B (generator GA is exporting energy to 
consumers CB). Country A exports are flowing through all interconnection lines for 
consumption in country B. In this setting, generators in country A and consumers in 
country B are benefiting and effectively using the transmission network of country C. 
They should therefore be entitled to cover part of country C’s transmission network costs. 
In the ideal situation with a single TSO for the entire network spanning over the three 
countries, the way costs are shared between network users is not an issue. The TSO can 
easily set its tariffs taking into consideration that generators in country A and consumers 
in country B are benefiting from the use of the network of country C. Even if network 
costs are different across the entire region, given that the same TSO is in charge of the 
three networks, these costs will be recovered efficiently. The TSO would charge to 
recover all its costs incurred across the entire network. Financial transfers within a region 
covered by a single TSO are possible, and compensation problems are therefore easily 
solved. 
 
 
 
                                                
48 In meshed network the definition of “transit” flows is broader and is often linked with 
loop flows (Cf. Daxhelet and Smeers, 2005), “Inter-TSO Compensation Mechanism”). For 
instance, in this situation a transit flow can also be generated by a transaction within a single 
country. Daxhelet and Smeers (2005) give such an example. They consider a subset of 
European transmission operators, composed of German, French, Dutch and Belgian system 
operators, in a configuration such that Germany is interconnected to the Netherland which 
is connected to Belgium, which is in turn connected to France, which is finally connected to 
Germany. In this configuration, they take the example of a large wind-based power 
generation in the north of Germany which supplies power to a large consuming centre in the 
south of the country. Although this is an intra-national transaction, given the configuration 
of the network, the large flow of power flowing from the North to the South of Germany 
will induce loop flows through the Netherlands, Belgium and France. This example shows 
that given the meshed configuration of the network, a transit flow can also be generated by 
an intra-national transaction. 
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Figure 6: The Problem of Transit Flows 
 
In the multiple TSOs case, in which each country A, B and C, has its own TSO, for each 
national network, the costs are supported by the TSO in charge of this national network. 
In other words, each TSO has the following budget constraint: the revenue coming from 
national network tariffs should be in balance with the national network costs. 
Consequently, for the power generated in A and designated to consumption in B, neither 
the generator in A nor the consumer in B is entitled to pay for network charges in country 
C, even though part of the flow is transiting by country C and is therefore inducing costs 
to the TSO in country C. 
In this setting, it would be reasonable to have local network users in country B supporting 
part of the network costs incurred in country C. In other words, it would be justified in 
finding a mechanism which would enable the compensation of the TSO of country C for 
the costs induced by the flow transiting through its network but designated for clients in a 
foreign country.  
It is worth noting that, by using country C’s network, country B might be inducing an 
incremental cost for C for all types of costs, be there network infrastructure and operation 
costs, system services costs or losses costs.49 Therefore, the compensation issue created 
by transit flow would be valid for all these types of costs. 
Thus it is clear that in these types of transit situations there is a compensation problem 
given the multi-TSO organisation. To solve this compensation problem, TSOs could 
impose cross-border tariffs at the border (trying to ‘catch’ transit flows) or by a specific 
compensation mechanism designed to ensure the necessary financial transfers. 
                                                
49 Transits might also create benefits for the transit country, for instance creating counter 
flows and consequently decreasing internal losses or creating flows which increase other 
cross-border congestion rents. Thus, these benefits should also be included in the 
compensation mechanism. See for instance, Sintef (2007), “Transit in the European Power 
Market”, SINTEF Energy Research, November 2007. 
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The problem of exporting/importing countries. 
A problem of compensation also arises when the use of external networks is considerably 
asymmetrical between two countries. Although flows created between these two 
countries cannot be considered per se as ‘transit’ flows (i.e., there is not a third country), 
they lead to similar compensation issues. 
Let us consider the following example of a hypothetical system composed of two 
interconnected national networks, A and B (cf. figure 7). Suppose also that in both 
countries the network costs are only supported by consumers (load). Moreover, assume 
that in this system one country (A) is constantly exporting to the other country (B) and 
within the exporting country, an important section of the domestic transmission network 
is (almost) exclusively used for exported electricity (red section). Thus the network costs 
of the exporting country are higher than what they would be in a situation without cross 
border flows. 
 
Figure 7: The Problem of Exporting/Importing Countries 
 
As explained before, in the ideal situation where there is a single TSO for the entire 
network of the two countries, allocating costs between network users is not an issue. The 
TSO can easily set its tariffs taking into consideration that consumers in country A are 
benefiting from the use of the network of country B. 
In the multiple TSOs case, a problem of compensation arises because each TSO should 
ensure his own budget constraint, i.e. that the national network costs are only covered by 
domestic users. Consumers in country A have to pay for the full costs of the network in A 
even though the largest section of this network is used by consumers in country B. Again, 
as explained in the previous example, a consumer in country B is only entitled to pay 
charges in country B. In this configuration, compensation between the TSO of country B 
and the TSO of country A would also be justified in order for users in country B to cover 
part of the network costs incurred by country A.  
Again, as in the previous case with three countries and transit flows, this problem could 
be compelling for all types of costs, and therefore there would be a compensation issue 
Country A Country B 
CA 
GA GB 
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not only for network infrastructure and operating costs, but also for systems services and 
losses costs. 
It is important to note that compensation problems only arise in specific situations: there 
should be clear asymmetrical use of the neighbour network or clear asymmetrical cost. If 
the network and costs are symmetrical between the two countries and if there is a 
symmetrical use of the system in the two countries (for instance half of the time one 
country exports and the other half imports), there would not be any compensation issue. 
If it is not the case, then there will be a compensation issue, and network users would pay 
more or less than it would in a single TSO configuration. 
Thus, in the case where compensation is needed, it could be implemented by imposing 
cross-border tariffs at the border or by a compensation mechanism.50 
The problem of the lack of harmonization. 
Besides the compensation issues described above, there is a third type of problem 
resulting from a multi-TSOs organization: the lack of tariff harmonization between TSOs.  
To illustrate this idea, we have chosen a case as example that can arise with two countries 
in the absence of harmonization between these two countries. Suppose a hypothetical 
system with two interconnected national networks, A and B (cf. Figure 8). In each 
country (country A and country B), there is one generator (G) and one load (or consumer, 
C). Both systems are identical except in terms of their tariff regime and of their network 
charging regime. We can take for instance the extreme case in which in country A, 
network tariffs are paid exclusively by load (i.e. G=0% and L=100%), and in country B, 
network charges are solely recovered from generators (G=100% and L=0%). 
 
Figure 8: The Problem of the Lack of Harmonization 
 
                                                
50 Note that this kind of compensation problem could also be solved by sharing differently 
the network cost between generators and loads. For instance, if the part of the network cost 
that is only due to export in country A is allocated to GA, the problem of compensation 
disappears. However, this creates harmonization problems as it will be seen in the third 
example. 
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In this setting, if the generator in country B (GB) wants to export to the load or consumer 
in country A (CA), then GB will incur network charges in country B, and CA will pay 
network charges in country A. On the contrary, if the generator in country A (GA) wants 
to export electricity to the load in country B, neither GA nor CB will be entitled to pay 
network charges. A generator in country A can therefore export electricity to country B 
without paying any network charge. 
In this example, we clearly have an asymmetric situation which favours generators in 
country A for their exports, and consumers in country B for their imports. Consequently 
this situation also favours flows from country A to country B, and deters power flows 
from country B to country A. This situation creates two types of issues. Firstly, the 
situation creates a clear impediment to the establishment of an Internal Electricity Market 
given that competition field is not levelised. Moreover this situation can create distortion 
of investment decisions. Secondly, the lack of harmonization modifies and complicates 
the compensation issues given that allocating the cost of the network between consumers 
and generators will define the allocation of costs within network users and this allocation 
could or could not be in line with network benefits. 
Here again, to remedy to this situation, two possibilities can be considered:51 obviously, 
harmonizing network charges across all the TSO or by imposing special charges on the 
border.  
 
How to tackle compensation and harmonization issues? 
In the introduction we have briefly described the single-TSO hypothetical case as the 
reference case in which a “single system paradigm” would be achieved. In the presence 
of several TSOs, we have shown that compensation and harmonization issues between 
these TSOs could arise and should be solved to get closer to the “single system 
paradigm” situation while maintaining several TSOs. 
If these issues are not solved several problems could arise and the system would be 
unsustainable. Indeed if compensation problems stay, losers will refuse to collaborate 
with the creating of a regional market. They can do that by not investing in nation 
infrastructure needed for cross-border trade, by refusing to cooperate to increase the 
interconnection capacity or by refusing to cooperate in other forms of market integration 
as the use of efficient market mechanism to increase the efficiency of cross border trade 
(e.g., the creation of market coupling platforms). Moreover, long run distortion in the 
cross-border competition will appear if the harmonization problem is not solved. 
Therefore, in order to ensure a workable and sustainable IEM, compensation and 
harmonization issues should be tackled. Although cross-border and transit tariffs could 
solve, at least partially, the compensation and harmonization problems, the latter requires 
regional, comprehensive and adapted solutions. This has been the way forward chosen in 
Europe, when implementing the EU ITC mechanism and tariff harmonization guidelines.  
                                                
51 In a way, this asymmetry issue could also be solved by using a compensation mechanism, 
but in fact, this would be equivalent to harmonizing the ways network charges are applied. 
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2.2. The Role of the EU Inter-TSO Compensation Mechanism and the Tariff 
Harmonization Guidelines 
In Europe two instruments are being implemented to tackle compensation and 
harmonization problems. These instruments are key milestones in order to achieve a 
sustainable “single system paradigm”. These two instruments are the EU ITC mechanism 
and a set of tariff harmonization guidelines. In this subsection, we briefly describe the 
principles of these mechanisms and point out their current capabilities.  
The EU ITC mechanism 
An annual voluntary Inter-TSO Compensation scheme was introduced in 2002. A legal 
basis for a mandatory ITC mechanism was eventually introduced in July 2004 with the 
adoption of EC Regulation 1228/2003.52 This regulation proposed the adoption of 
binding guidelines for the ITC mechanism but this did not happen till today. 
Respectively, a voluntary compensation mechanism has evolved and the number of 
countries involved have considerably increased since 2002 (see appendix 1 for a brief 
description of the ITC mechanism history). Following several studies and difficult 
negotiations, in September 2010 new legally binding guidelines were approved with the 
release by the EC of the final regulation (Regulation (EC) No 838/2010))53. Nevertheless, 
the new guidelines keep the main design characteristics of the former voluntary ITC 
mechanism (in particular, the mechanism still only includes transit flows, infrastructure 
costs and losses, see below). 
The Inter-TSO Compensation mechanism provides compensation to a national TSO for 
the use of its network by parties based in other countries. The compensation mechanism 
is composed of two components. There is a compensation for losses incurred on national 
transmission system as a result of cross-border flows of electricity, and there is a 
compensation for provision of infrastructure for cross-border flows of electricity (see 
appendix 2 for a more detailed explanation of the current ITC mechanism). 
• Compensation for losses: The level of transmission losses compensation payment is 
based on two factors, namely the value of transit losses and the level each 
participating country contributes to the total network losses. The value of 
transmission losses costs resulting from cross-border flows is calculated on a With or 
Without Transit (“WWT”) method54. This method is based on a comparison of the 
                                                
52 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. 
53 OJ L250. 
54 For losses, the total size of the compensation fund is computed as the sum of individual 
compensations due to all countries, while the required contribution of each TSO is 
calculated on the same basis as for compensation for provision of infrastructure. As 
highlighted by Olmos Camacho and Pérez-Arriaga (2007), one of the serious drawbacks of 
the WWT method is that the algorithm does not determine which countries have to 
contribute to the compensation due to another country and to what extent each of them 
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flows on the network between two scenarios, the first one corresponding to the actual 
system operation (i.e.  actual network flows), and the second one being a load flow 
situation resulting from excluding transit flows, i.e. in which transits are removed and 
the hypothetical network flows needed to maintain system stability are calculated. 
The difference in network usage indicates the extent to which the network has been 
used to host transit flows and thus the extent to which, if at all, a TSO is entitled to 
compensation. The losses component is subject to ex-post adjustment to reflect 
deviations from ex-ante scheduled import and exports. 
• Compensation for provision of infrastructure: The level of infrastructure 
compensation payment is based on two factors: the value of the infrastructure assets 
used to host transit flows and the level of transit flows between participating 
countries.  
 
EU tariff harmonization guidelines. 
Harmonization aims at facilitating competition of the interconnected transmission system 
across Europe and at avoiding the distortion of long-run investment decisions. Article 8 
of Regulation 1228/200355 provides that the guidelines should “also determine 
appropriate rules leading to a progressive harmonisation of the underlying principles for 
the setting of charges applied to producers and consumers”, without setting specific 
rules. 
In 2005, ERGEG prepared draft guidelines on transmission tarification after extensive 
consultation. They proposed that ‘G’ charges should be harmonized on the basis of the 
national average level of G-charges.56 After proposing these guidelines on transmission 
tarification, ERGEG launched a public consultation. In 2010, following this consultation, 
the EC could have notably decided either to take no action regarding harmonization, to 
adopt the 2005 draft ERGEG guidelines or to amend them by adjusting the range of 
allowable generation tariffs for using transmission system. The decision was finally taken 
to adopt the ERGEG guidelines.  
Regulation (EC) No 838/2010 also sets the ‘guidelines for a common regulatory 
approach to transmission charging’.57 The regulation clarifies the way transmission 
charges should be calculated. And it sets ranges for all Member States for annual average 
transmission charges paid by producers. More precisely, the final regulation sets a range 
                                                                                                                                
must contribute to this compensation. As mentioned below, the global compensation fund is 
derived from the aggregation of compensations due to all countries and then, contributions 
to the fund are computed on the basis of the net exports and imports of each country. 
55 Article 8 
56 Harmonization could have been envisaged as setting out rules to ensure that generators 
charges are assessed on the same basis across the internal market (in terms of proportion of 
network costs borne by generators and how network costs are calculated) or directly as 
setting a range of allowable charges for generators. 
57 Part B of Regulation (EC) No 838/2010. 
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for each country within which transmission charges should be.58 The draft guidelines 
provide a range of 0-0.5 €/MWh for generation charges for continental Europe, but it 
allows for a larger range for average generation charges in the Nordel system, Ireland, 
Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Romania. More precisely, the value of annual 
average transmission charges paid by producers should be within a range of 0-1.2 €/MWh 
in Denmark, Sweden and Finland; of 0-2.5 €/MWh in Ireland, Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland; and of 0-2.0 €/MWh in Romania.59 The Agency for the Co-operation of Energy 
Regulators is responsible to monitor the appropriateness of the ranges of allowable 
transmission charges, and doing so should notably take into consideration the impact 
these charges have on the financing of transmission capacity needed by Member States 
and their impact on system users in general. 
 
Assessment of the current EU ITC mechanism and harmonization guidelines. 
An ideal compensation scheme will ensure all needed compensations between the TSOs. 
This mechanism and the corresponding pass-through to each TSO tariff and charges 
should exactly replicate the payments that network users would realize if there was a 
unique EU TSO or the “single system paradigm”. An ideal compensation scheme should 
include all the costs and should measure how network users located in particular zones 
should share the network and operating costs of other zones. 
The current EU ITC mechanism and harmonization guidelines have made an important 
step toward a single system paradigm. Its implementation has served to suppress all the 
cross-border tariffs within continental Europe and to contribute considerably to the 
establishment of the internal market. However, the current EU ITC mechanism does not 
correspond to the ideal design we have presented earlier. There are several issues that are 
not addressed by the current design of the mechanism and we describe some of them 
below. 
Besides the critics related to the chosen “use-of-the-network” methodologies60, the 
current ITC mechanism has two main drawbacks: i) it does not consider all the flows and, 
                                                
58 It also gives some precisions on the way these charges should be calculated for 
comparison with the ranges set out in the regulation. 
59 Yet, the regulation does not clarify on the actions to be taken for a greater harmonization 
across European countries. 
60 The current ITC mechanism has also been criticized for several methodological problems. 
For instance, the WWT method used for losses requires the definition of the ‘without’ 
scenario, which is dependent on the location of political borders; therefore the method is not 
consistent with the ‘single system paradigm’ (Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga, 2007)). Moreover 
the WWT method computes the compensation entitlements of the different TSOs separately 
from their responsibility in financing the overall compensation fund. There is no intrinsic 
consistency in the way compensation entitlements and responsibilities are computed. Put 
differently, the mechanism employed to determine the TSO’s entitlement to compensation 
does not provide any indication regarding the allocation of responsibility for such 
compensation and ad hoc criteria need to be used (FSR, 2005). Consequently, each TSO is 
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ii) it only covers specific network costs (losses and infrastructure costs). The current 
mechanism focuses on “transit” cost compensation.61 Even though analyses suggested the 
importance to include all cross-border flows, the final regulation only considers transit 
flows for the calculation of compensations for losses and for provision of the 
infrastructure. Yet, one of the criteria for a good mechanism is that it should take into 
consideration all flows.62 Moreover, the compensation scheme only includes losses and 
network costs. For instance, system services costs are excluded from the ITC 
mechanism,63 although ETSO was arguing for a scheme which took into consideration 
other types of costs. 
Regarding harmonization guidelines, the critics have been focused on their high 
flexibility. In fact, as harmonisation guidelines only set ranges of allowed tariffs, they 
would not give enough indications of what would be a perfectly harmonized tariff 
system. Moreover, as shown in Table 2, except for Austria and Norway, the required 
maximum annual average transmission charge paid by the producers as set in the 
regulation is actually lower than the average generation tariff paid by generators in the 
year 2009. Therefore, the harmonisation rules do not seem to be restrictive and will not 
change the situation.  
                                                                                                                                
assumed to pay every TSO in the region the same fraction of the total compensation due to 
the latter, irrespective of the geographical or electrical proximity of the grids of the two 
TSOs. Finally, the ‘without’ scenario in the WWT method may result in lower flows over 
specific elements of the regional grid. This method therefore allows the identification of 
those transit flows that have a beneficial impact on the utilization of such elements. 
However, this impact may be affected by the specific definition of transits (Olmos and 
Pérez-Arriaga, 2007). 
61 Cf. Sintef (2007), “Transit in the European Power Market”, SINTEF Energy Research, 
November 2007. 
62 Cf. FSR (2005). 
63 Note that the exclusion of these costs was already explicit in Regulation 1228/2003. 
However, they have not been excluded from the ITC mechanism because they are operating 
costs. Losses costs are also operating costs and they are included in the ITC mechanism. 
Two possible reasons might explain why system services costs have been excluded: i) system 
services are considered “local” costs and that they are really not affected by cross-border 
trades so compensation is not necessary and/or ii) the high complexity in estimating the 
compensation for system services and the corresponding sensibility to opportunistic 
behaviors. ETSO comments on draft ERGEG guidelines in 2006 call some operating costs 
in the compensation mechanism to be included: “All TSOs, but one, consider that costs related to 
network assets should also include costs, as allowed by the concerned regulator, related to operation of these 
assets (costs of control rooms and dispatch operations) at least for voltage levels used in the ITC mechanism, 
and exclude the net costs of balancing the system and the cost of procuring ancillary services” (ETSO, 2006. 
“ETSO Comments on ERGEG draft proposal of Guidelines on Inter-TSO compensation”, 
May 2006). However, the final approved guidelines did not include these costs in the binding 
ITC mechanism. 
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Table 2: The problem of the lack of harmonization 
Country
Generation tariffs paid in 2009 in 'base case' as 
efined by ENTSO-E
Maximum annual average transmission charges 
paid by producers as required by Regulation 
(EU) No 838/2010
(€/MWh) (€/MWh)
[A] [B]
Austria 1.6 0.5
Denmark 0.4 1.2
Finland 0.3 1.2
France 0.2 0.5
Great Britain 1 2.5
Ireland 1.2 2.5
Italy 0.2 0.5
Norway 1 0.5
Poland 0.1 0.5
Romania 1.8 2
Sweden 0.6 1.2
Notes and Sources: [A]: Approximative values - ENTSOE (2010). ENTSO-E Overview of transmission tariffs in Europe: Synthesis 2009
[B]: Part B of the regulation (EC) No 838/2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the inter-TSO compensation 
mechanism and a common regulatory approach to tansmission charging  
 
In conclusion, although the current ITC mechanism and harmonization guidelines are an 
important step toward a “single system paradigm”, they do not solve all the issues of 
having a system with several TSOs. This unsolved problem could be used as an argument 
to justify the application of cross-border tariffs to interconnector users. In the following 
section, we show that applying cross-border tariffs could not be the most efficient way to 
solve compensation and harmonization issues in general and for the particular case of the 
BritNed Cable. 
 
2.3. Is Charging BritNed an Efficient and Effective Way to Solve 
Compensation and Harmonization Issues?  
Could UK charges on interconnectors solve compensation problems between TSOs? 
The “single system paradigm”, which implies that national network charges provide 
access to the entire EU network, is founded on the existence of a cost compensation 
mechanism between TSOs.64 Indeed, different network characteristics or situations (e.g. 
transit, exporting or importing country) may create differences between the network and 
operating costs incurred by different TSOs. To be sustainable, the “single system 
paradigm” should be complemented with a compensation scheme for at least external 
                                                
64 FSR 2005 
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network use and implied infrastructure and operating costs (losses and/or system 
services).  
An ideal compensation scheme would ensure all needed compensations between the 
TSOs. This mechanism and the corresponding pass-through to each TSO tariff and 
charges should exactly replicate the payments that network users would realize if there 
was a unique EU TSO. An ideal compensation scheme should include all the costs and 
should measure how network users located in particular zones should share the network 
and operating costs of other zones. 
In Europe, the role of compensation is currently ensured by the ITC mechanism. It 
focuses on “transit” costs compensation and only includes losses and (infrastructure) 
network costs (i.e., system services costs are excluded from the ITC mechanism). So, it 
might be argued that TNUoS and BSUoS charges on interconnectors can be justified by 
the lack of cost compensations between EU countries. 
A proper analysis of this argument should be done case by case (border by border) given 
that compensation needs will depend on each specific interconnector flows pattern and 
each TSO network situation. However, a preliminary analysis of this argument for the 
case of BritNed indicates that this might not be economically founded.65 
The situation of the two systems connected by BritNed cable, British and Dutch 
networks, is nearer to exporting/importing case than the transit country case.66 Thus to 
show that there would be a need of compensation between these two systems, two 
conditions have to be verified: i) there should be a considerable asymmetrical use of the 
systems and ii) there should be a difference in costs and this difference should only be 
due to asymmetrical use of the system. We focus here on TNUoS and BSUoS charges 
given that, as shown previously, losses “charges” applied to interconnectors are not 
playing a role of compensation because they are only covering the cost of losses of the 
interconnector. 
The first condition to be verified to demonstrate the need for compensation between 
NGET and Tennet is whether the use of external networks between the two countries is 
considerably asymmetrical or not. For instance, an asymmetrical case would be when one 
country is constantly exporting to the other country, a situation that would consequently 
increase its network and operating costs during the whole year. This does not seem to be 
the case of BritNed potential flows. Historical simulations of hourly flow directions 
indicate that NL to UK cross-border efficient transactions (i.e., those where energy price 
in NL is higher than energy price in UK) occur 48% of the time and UK to NL cross 
border efficient transactions occur 42% of the time. During the rest of the time (10%), 
                                                
65 Further analysis would need a detailed hour-by-hour study of network and system services 
costs of both countries and the assessment of the impact of interconnection flows on these 
costs. 
66 Strictly speaking, there can be also ‘transits’ flows going through these countries. For 
instance, the Netherlands can be a transit country if German agents export to UK or the UK 
can be a transit country if Ireland exports to the Netherlands.  
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there is no flow between countries67. Thus this means that both British and Dutch 
consumers (load), which are covering an important part of network costs, are benefiting 
from the cross-border transactions. 
The second condition to be verified to demonstrate the need of compensation between 
NGET and Tennet is that the difference in network and operating costs between countries 
is exclusively due to the asymmetrical use of the network and that this difference is not 
due to other issues (e.g., costs related only to national use of the network, inefficient 
management, investments or other external issues as regulation costs, taxes, etc.). We 
will verify this condition first for BSUoS charges and then for TNUoS charges. 
At first glance, average system services costs in the UK and in the Netherlands are not 
very different (around 2 €/MWh, see figure 9). This would indicate that no compensation 
from Dutch users to British users is needed concerning BSUoS charges. 
Figure 9: Infrastructure and System Services Charges in EU 
 
Source: ENTSO (2010)68 
                                                
67 Cf. Moss Ian, (2009), “APX-ENDEX, Market Coupling & BritNed”, BritNed Connect 
Seminar, 10th December 2009 or von der Fehr and Newberry, (2003), “UK-Netherlands DC 
Interconnector”.  
 
 
The UK Charging System on Interconnectors 
Florence School of Regulation 
 
 
42 
The situation with infrastructure costs is much more asymmetrical. Average 
infrastructure costs are twice as high in UK than in the Netherlands (around 5 €/MWh for 
UK against 2.5 €/MWh for the Netherlands). This is mostly due to different national 
network sizes and topological configurations. In the UK, the main centres of generation 
and consumption are separated by a large distance while in the Netherlands generation 
and consumption centres are much closer (see figure 10). To prove that it could be an 
argument for compensation from Tennet to NGET, one should verify that during UK 
exporting periods, Dutch consumers benefit, at least partially, from UK north-south 
network infrastructures. Although quantitative analysis should be carried out to determine 
how UK infrastructures will be used by Dutch consumers via the BritNed interconnector, 
it seems unlikely that this accounts for a large part of the cost difference. For instance, it 
is possible that during UK exporting periods, energy is produced by generators located 
near British consumption which would imply that Dutch consumers are not using the 
network.  
 
Figure 10: Infrastructure and System Services Charges in EU 
 
In conclusion, it is not clear whether there is a need for compensation from Tennet to 
NGET in terms of supplementary costs created by BritNed power flows. Even if this 
compensation between Tennet and NGET were needed, it would not imply that imposing 
TNUoS charges on interconnector users would allow recovering the correct amount of 
money. Thus, to avoid pancaking problems and short-term inefficiencies, more general or 
regional solutions (e.g., ITC mechanism) would be preferred to border by border 
corrections. 
                                                                                                                                
68 ENTSO-E (2010), “Overview of transmission tariffs in Europe: Synthesis 2009”, July 
2010 (www.entsoe.eu) 
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Could UK charges on interconnectors solve the harmonization problem? 
It is well-known that transmission network tariff regimes are not perfectly harmonized 
across Europe (cf. appendix 1).69 It might be argued that network charges on 
interconnectors can be justified by the lack of harmonization of EU tariff regimes.  
Network cost allocation between generators and loads (often called the G and L terms) is 
one of the main non-harmonized elements of EU tariff regimes.70 This lack of 
harmonization of tariff regimes can create some long-term distortions of competition. For 
instance, in a system composed of two neighbouring countries, if only loads are paying 
transmission tariffs in one country (i.e. L=100%) and only generators are paying 
transmission tariffs in the other (i.e. G=100%), there is a clear advantage to increase 
generation capacity in the first country and to supply load in the second country.  
It could be tempting to correct this lack of harmonization problem with network tariffs 
applied to interconnector users. However, this is not the most appropriate solution from 
an economic perspective. There are at least three reasons for this. Firstly, allocating 
network charges to interconnectors creates pancaking problems and short term 
inefficiencies (see above). Secondly, interconnector tariffs could correct the lack of 
harmonization only for the case of two countries. Indeed if there are three different 
countries with different tariff regimes (e.g., country A with G=50% and L=50%, country 
B with G=0% and L=100% and country C with G=10% and L=90%) the interconnector 
charging regime would not be able to completely correct lack of harmonization between 
them. Thirdly, current network charges applied to interconnector users may worsen the 
problem of harmonization. Consider for instance the case of BSUoS charges applied to 
the interconnector between the UK and France (IFA cable). BSUoS charges in the UK 
are shared 50:50 between generators and loads (i.e. G=50% and L=50%) whereas in 
France these charges (mainly integrated in the network tariff) are recovered exclusively 
from load (i.e. G=0% and L=100%). Applying UK BSUoS charges to interconnectors 
only “harmonizes” the situation for generators with respect to UK consumers/load, i.e., 
British or French generators have to pay the same BSUoS charges to sell in UK. 
However, this worsens the problem of harmonization for generators with respect to 
French consumers/loads given that British generators have to pay BSUoS which are twice 
as high as those paid by French generators.  
In conclusion, applying network charges to interconnector users would not be the most 
efficient and effective way to deal with non-harmonization problems. More general or 
                                                
69 The lack of harmonization is present in the level of tariffs as well as the tariff structure (i.e. 
G and L terms, capacity and energy terms, etc.). Cf. ENTSO-E (2009), “ETSO Overview of 
transmission tariffs in Europe: Synthesis 2008”, www.entsoe.eu ; Perez-Arriaga (2008), 
“Transmission issues in cross-border trading of electricity Internal compensation charges in 
the EU”, ENERGY POLICY RESEARCH SEMINAR JFK School of Government 
Cambridge, December 15, 2008. 
70 There are other non-harmonized elements, for instance, the definition of balancing 
mechanism (e.g., the size of the settlement period), the allocation of availability payments on 
imbalance prices, etc.  
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regional solutions, such as avoiding border by border corrections, will be preferred (e.g., 
harmonization guidelines) and would be more economically efficient.  
 
2.4. Conclusions of the Compensation and Harmonization Analysis 
In the presence of several TSOs, a workable EU internal electricity market can only be 
ensured in a system working under the “single system paradigm”. This implies that 
compensation and harmonization issues between these TSOs should be completely 
resolved. Solving these issues is critical to ensuring the sustainability of an integrated 
market and a fair cross-border competition in the long-run. 
Unilateral solutions to tackle compensation or harmonization problems as charging 
interconnector are far from being efficient and effective. Indeed these types of solutions 
seem to create/reinforce cross-border problems. In fact compensation and harmonization 
issues call for regional, multilateral and comprehensive solutions. This has been the way 
forward chosen in Europe by implementing the EU ITC mechanism and tariff 
harmonization guidelines. Although the current ITC mechanism and tariff harmonization 
guidelines are not perfect, they have considerably improved the situation. Unsolved 
issues should be tackled by improving current instruments and not by charging 
interconnectors. 
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Part B. Legal Analysis 
 
This section analyses the compliance of the UK network charges system as applied on 
interconnectors and interconnector users under the sector specific regulation and general 
EU law. This issue, besides others, has recently been addressed in a reasoned opinion by 
the European Commission (June 2010).71 The Commission identified various violations. 
One of the key issues was concerns about the UK’s provisions on network charges. The 
Commission considered them to be not in line with the requirements of Regulation (EC) 
No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity.72  
Our analysis confirms such result. The existing charging system as applied on 
interconnectors is not in compliance with the sector specific legislation. By the same 
token, it does not respect the spirit of EU law, which sees the role of interconnectors as to 
promote access for any EU operator to a “European” grid.  
 
3. The Legality of the UK Charging System under 
Sector Specific Legislation 
This section examines whether the UK charging system applied to interconnectors and 
interconnector users run counter to the EU sector specific legislation, namely Regulation 
(EC) 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity.73  
 
3.1. Provisions Governing the Connection of an Interconnector to the UK 
Transmission System 
In the UK, the connection of an interconnector to the British transmission system is 
governed by the Connection and Use of System Code (CUSC). A company operating an 
                                                
71 Energy: Commission requests 20 Member States to implement and apply Single Market 
rules without delay - country fact sheets, Memo 10/725, Brussels 24 June 2010. Besides 
concerns with regard to the legality of the charges system there were other issues, such as: 
the information on interconnection capacity is still  insufficient; network congestion is 
managed in a way which  is not in line with the requirements of the Regulation; there is still 
no intraday congestion management mechanism at all interconnections, nor is there a 
common co-coordinated congestion management method. 
72 Regulation 1228/2003 of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-
border exchanges in electricity, O.J. 15.7.2003, L 176/1. 
73 Regulation 714/2009/EC of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for 
cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, OJ 
L211/15. 
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interconnector must enter into a bilateral connection agreement declaring the CUSC 
binding upon it. The CUSC, being subject to approval by the gas and electricity markets 
authority Ofgem, foresees the payment of TNUoS, BNUoS and connection charges.74  
As outlined in the framework of the economic analysis, to date TNUoS charges are 
applied to three types of transmission users: (i) generators, (ii) consumers and (iii) 
interconnector owners. In terms of tariffs levied upon them, interconnectors were 
considered as generators in importing situations (i.e., flows going into UK) and as 
consumers in exporting situations (i.e., flows leaving UK). However, as mentioned 
above, in the aftermath of the public consultation by NGET in 2010, Ofgem changed the 
UK network charges regime: interconnectors will be treated as a separate class of 
transmission users, distinct from generation or demand, and they will be exempted from 
TNUoS charges.75   
BSUoS charges to date are applied separately to production (generation or imports from 
interconnectors) and consumption (demand or export to interconnectors). Their 
lawfulness has not been subject to the review undertaken recently. Generally all CUSC 
Parties including interconnector users are liable for BSUoS charges on the basis of the 
energy they take from or supply to the NGET system.  
 
3.2. Structure of Regulation 714/2009 
It was in the context of the Florence process that rules on cross-border exchanges were 
finally negotiated between participants. The final compromise was then made legally 
binding by the European Commission by means of Regulation 1228/2003. Regulation 
1228/2003 had a clear harmonization purpose, especially concerning tariffs for cross-
border transactions, since the national tariff systems in use diverged too widely, thereby 
creating trade distortions.76 The primary objective of Regulation 1228/2003 was to clarify 
the rules of the game in three core areas: cross-border tariffs and ITC scheme, 
transparency, methods of cross-border capacity allocation. The first area is of interest to 
us in the context of this report. We note that the new Regulation 714/2009 leaves the 
wording of Regulation 1228/2003 unchanged in this area. 
A core objective of the Regulation is to outlaw distance-related tariffs and pancaking. It 
is clear that specific import and export charges, such as BNUoS and TNUoS applied on 
                                                
74 See National Grid, Charging and Connections – current arrangements. Available at: 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/PT/Documents1/TransmiT_Event_NG.pdf 
75 Cf. Ofgem (2010), Decision letter in relation to Use of System Charging Methodology 
Proposal GB ECM-26 “Review of interconnector charging arrangements”, October 2010 
(http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=132&refer=Networks/Tr
ans/ElecTransPolicy/Charging) 
76 Recital 11 of the Regulation 1228/2003. 
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interconnectors and interconnector users, amount to distance-related charges within the 
meaning of the Regulation.77  
In practice physical flows do not match contracted paths and opposite contractual flows 
may net each other. It thus makes sense to set up a framework where compensation for 
the use of national networks is not based on individual fees for international trade but on 
a global compensation mechanism based on physical flows. It has been agreed during the 
negotiations that costs will be equally split between the importing and the exporting 
countries. Imposing additional costs on market players who created cross-border flows 
could be considered more cost-reflective but this solution was not retained. It was indeed 
considered that all market players benefit from the completion of a truly single market for 
electricity. Actual physical flows also do not directly result from cross-border trade but 
from imbalances between surplus and deficit areas. Consequently, it was finally decided 
to fully socialise transit costs among all network users in each country.78  
The Regulation on cross-border exchanges addresses the network charging system of 
Member States through two complementary mechanisms:  
Art 13 provides for a compulsory ITC mechanism at EU level. It establishes the right of 
TSOs to be compensated for the costs they bear as a result of hosting cross-border flows 
of electricity along their networks. It thus prevents pancaking by ruling out national TSOs 
to get compensation bilaterally through additional charges. Compensation should be 
based on real costs incurred. This means that they should also take into account the 
possible advantages of hosting cross-border flows (e.g. reduction of losses). Art 13 leaves 
room for the enactment of implementing guidelines under Art 18. Accordingly, the new 
Regulations 774/2010 (expired on the 2nd of March 2011) and 838/201079 (entered into 
force on the 3rd of March 2011) are meant to implement a binding ITC mechanism, 
thereby replacing the former voluntary one.  
Art 14 aims to limit differences in national tariff systems that would create trade 
distortions. It only applies to consumers and producers. Additional import/export fees are 
contrary to Art 14. National charges should be non-discriminatory, cost-reflective and not 
distance-related (Art 14(1)). Art 14(5) explicitly states that there shall be no specific 
network charge on individual transactions for declared transits of electricity. Additional 
costs should indeed be socialized over the whole network users and not solely be placed 
                                                
77 See e.g. the Commission’s impact assessment accompanying the proposal for an ITC at 
section 2.1. and 2.2. 
78 This choice however creates problems as market players do not take into account the 
network costs they create when they take locational decisions, thereby creating increased 
congestions in cheaper areas. To compensate, Art 4 of the Regulation provided for the 
opportunity to increase network charges in surplus areas, although it was not an obligation. 
These locational signals however de facto exist in practice where auctions for interconnection 
capacities are organized to deal with congestions. 
79 Commission Regulation (EU) No 838/2010 of 23 September 2010 on laying down 
guidelines relating to the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a 
common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
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on exporters/importers. We note that trade distortions are still possible as Member States 
retain the right to fix domestic charges (Art 14(2)). However, the new Regulation 
838/2010 aims to put a limit to this by setting a range (in EUR/MWh) within which each 
Member States’ annual average transmission charge should stand (Recital 10, Art 2, Part 
B). 
There are clearly two different but complementary mechanisms and one must take into 
account the results of the other (Art 14(3)(a)). Art 13 and 14 are therefore the relevant 
norms against which one has to assess the lawfulness of the UK charging system. 
 
3.3. TNUoS and BSUoS Charges under Art 14 of Regulation 714/2009 
As already mentioned, Art 14 defines the conditions for setting the charges for access to 
the network. The provision explicitly foresees that these charges may be born by 
consumers and producers (Art 14(2)).  
As concerns TNUoS charges, NGET used to consider that interconnector owners were 
consumers (when withdrawing) or producers (when injecting) for the purpose of network 
charging. This interpretation does not follow the rationale of the Regulation which sees 
interconnectors as interfaces between national transmission systems. The Regulation read 
in conjunction with Directive 2009/72/EC is unambiguous in this regard (see Art 2 of 
both the Directive and the Regulation). Art 2(13) of the Directive makes clear that 
interconnectors are only “equipment used to link electricity systems” whereas a generator 
is “a natural or legal person generating electricity” (Art 2(2)) and wholesale consumers 
are “natural or legal person purchasing electricity for the purpose of resale inside or 
outside the system where he is established” (Art (2)(8)). Producers, consumers and 
interconnectors are thus different concepts clearly delimited from each other. Britned 
clearly does not generate or purchase electricity itself. We note that the fact that Britned 
is a DC cable does not change the fact that it cannot be seen as a generator. Actually, 
flows are controllable, so Britned is close to a power plant in that perspective. However, 
Britned follows the results of the market (implicit auction) or the schedules of markets 
participants. So the flows depend on market participants, rather than on Britned’s 
decisions. We note that there is no incentive for traders to voluntarily create an imbalance 
in real time (i.e. not respecting the day ahead scheduled programs). This could happen 
only if both NGET and TenneT allowed traders to sell cross-border balancing services. 
Overall, Art 14 of Regulation 714/2009 does not allow for the imposition of TNUoS on 
Britned since interconnectors are not the addressee of the norm. 
We also note that the European Commission in the context of dispute settlements never 
considered interconnectors as part of the wholesale supply market. Following its line of 
reasoning in the UK-France interconnector and Viking Cable settlements (and 
 
 
The UK Charging System on Interconnectors 
Florence School of Regulation 
 
 
49 
subsequent cases),80 interconnectors have always been considered explicitly or implicitly 
part of the market for transmission services between Member States.81 
The case of BNUoS charges is slightly different, since they are intended to be applied on 
interconnector users. It would be technically possible for the explicit auction part (it can 
be introduced in the auction price, and users would be traceable) but not for the market 
coupling part (where users are not traceable and it is much harder to introduce it in the 
PX algorithm). As a default solution, Britned would bear the charges.  
For the part imposed on Britned, the analysis is the same as for TNUoS charges. Britned 
is not a producer or user and therefore should not bear any charges. In parallel, additional 
BNUoS charges on cross-border traders cannot be introduced in the explicit auction price 
as it would amount to make cross-border traders pay twice for a domestic tariff, which is 
exactly what the Regulation aims to avoid. The Regulation 714/2009 is clear in its Recital 
15: “It would not be appropriate to apply […] a specific tariff to be paid only by 
exporters or importers in addition to the general charge for access to the national 
network”.82 If compensation is indeed legitimate, then it has to be done through the ITC 
mechanism (Art 13). 
Lastly, our economic analysis has clearly shown that the existing charging system 
complicates the implementation of efficient market coupling solutions. It is true that 
impairing market coupling is not expressly in breach of the Electricity Regulation as long 
as non-discriminatory market-based methods such as explicit auctioning are in use (para 
2.1 of the congestion management guidelines). However, one of the main tasks of TSOs 
remains to facilitate market integration (Art 12 of the Directive) and that to this end “the 
maximum capacity of the interconnections […] shall be made available to market 
participants” (Art 16(3) of the Regulation). In addition, TSOs ought to cooperate under 
the Directive and the Regulation in order to create efficient regional markets. In view of 
the fast development of price coupling in the north-western European region, impairing 
market coupling goes counter this objective. In the present context, it is our opinion that 
only compelling reasons regarding network security or environmental concerns could 
justify limiting market coupling.  
 
3.4. TNUoS and BSUoS Charges under Art 13 Regulation 714/2009 
Compensation for costs incurred from cross-border flows are appropriately regulated 
under Art 13 which organizes inter-TSO compensation. Only as a result of compensation 
made under Art 13 NGET will be allowed to adjust TNUoS and BNUoS charges imposed 
on local producers and consumers (Recital 12, Art 13(3)(a)). 
                                                
80 Viking Cable, settlement in COMP/E-3/37.291; UK/France Interconnector, informal 
settlement, IP/01/341 of 12.03.2001. 
81 For more on this, see section 4. 
82 The new Regulation 838/2010 also states: “Each regulatory authority shall ensure that […] no 
additional charges for hosting cross-border flows of electricity are included in charges applied by transmission 
system operators for access to networks” (2.1. Part A). 
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We note that the coverage of Art 13 is very wide. It includes all cross-border flows, 
including export and import flows (Art 13(1)). It is thus not limited to transit flows. It 
also includes almost all categories of costs covered by TNUoS and BNUoS charges as it 
generally covers all “costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity 
on their network” (Art 13(1)).83 As a consequence, it cannot be argued that costs covered 
by TNUoS and BSUoS charges fall outside the scope of Art 13 and therefore can be 
compensated bilaterally.84 If compensation is legitimate, Art 13 provides a directly 
applicable and compulsory mechanism.  
An objection could be raised on the ground that the new binding ITC mechanism does 
not foresee compensation for all costs currently covered by the TNUoS and BNUoS 
charges (essentially balancing and internal congestion) and only addresses transit flows. 
Does this allow NGET to recover them bilaterally?85  
Our answer is negative. Art 13 is self-executing, i.e. is directly applicable and binding 
even in the absence of implementing guidelines and/or a possibly insufficient coverage of 
the existing compensation scheme. EU Regulations are directly applicable in national 
legal system and, in the event of any conflict with national laws and regulations the latter 
should be set aside or interpreted as to comply with EU legislation. The absence of 
certain implementation rules does not affect the compulsory nature of the provisions of 
the Regulation. We recall that guidelines are primarily tools for the interpretation of the 
rules of the Regulation and that they do not create new rules. Due to this self-executive 
nature, the absence of appropriate guidelines does not lead to the inapplicability of Art 13 
or even an application of Art 14 mutatis mutandis for the purpose of compensation. 
                                                
83 We note that Art 13 is not always perfectly clear on what “costs incurred as a result of hosting 
cross-border flows of electricity on their network” exactly means. If one of the components of the 
charges was not covered by Art 13, the legality would have then to be assessed exclusively 
under general EU law (see next section). 
84 We note that Art 14 also has a very wide definition of network charges, as it can include 
“the amount of network losses and congestion caused, and investment costs for infrastructure” (Art 14(2)). 
From an economic perspective, BSUoS charges (which include e.g. internal congestion 
management) do not qualify as access charges but rather as operational charges due to the 
fact that they are related to the ‘operation’ of the system. Whereas access charges refer to 
infrastructure as such, i.e. sub-stations, lines and cables, operating charges refer to those 
costs occurring while operating these infrastructures. Since the BSUoS charges at issue 
compensate for the services that the network operator, here NGET, needs to provide for in 
order to balance the transmission system (ancillary services; offers and bids made in the 
balancing mechanism and other services available to the licensee’s transmission system) we 
are not dealing with access charges in the usual sense. Nevertheless, we see that this 
differentiation is largely irrelevant in practice (most access charges in the different Member 
States include e.g. balancing services) and from a legal point of view (Art 13 and 14 include 
losses, internal congestion costs, etc). 
85 We note that we had the same problem with TNUoS, when there were no implementing 
guidelines. 
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We note that compensation through the ITC of the currently uncovered costs was 
foreseen but was finally not implemented. There are two reasons to this. First of all, the 
effect of cross-border trade on balancing/ancillary costs is generally considered marginal. 
The second reason is the high complexity86 of estimating the amount for compensation. 
In 2006, ETSO tried to include congestion management costs and other balancing costs in 
the compensation mechanism but finally agreed to leave them out. If NGET deems it 
necessary to have a wider ITC it cannot act unilaterally but depends on urging for a 
extension of scope at EU level of the existing ITC through new Art 18 guidelines. 
The last question is whether Britned could be considered as a TSO and therefore be liable 
to compensate NGET through the ITC mechanism. We note that this seems to be, the 
interpretation of Ofgem and BNetzA. In our view it is not the case. Art 3(2) clearly states 
that “the compensation shall be paid by the operators of national transmission systems 
from which the cross-border flows originate and the system where these flows end”. 
Flows will neither originate not end in Britned. Only when an interconnector is part of a 
single control block, and is therefore controlled by a national TSO, it can it be considered 
as part of a wider TSO (Art 2(2) (last paragraph)). The Directive and Regulation imposes 
on TSOs plenty of requirements which are not foreseen in the Art 17 procedure.87 
Overall, it is also clear that the new Regulation 838/2010 does not consider 
interconnectors as TSOs but as interfaces between TSOs.  
4. The UK Charging System under the EU 
Competition and Free Movement Rules 
This section examines whether the imposition of TNUoS and BSUoS charges on 
interconnectors and interconnector users by NGET complies with those provisions in EU 
law ensuring access to the Single Market: the competition and free movement rules.88  
While aiming at compensation, hence solving an internal problem, the UK charging 
system has a detrimental effect on the completion of the IEM. From an EU law 
perspective, it raises a typical ‘free movement’ problem. Nevertheless, we will primarily 
focus on compliance with the EU competition rules (Art 102 TFEU prohibiting abuses of 
dominance) for the following reasons: 
• In view of the recent Svenska Kraftnät (SvK) jurisprudence (2010), the Commission 
seems increasingly willing to use competition law to tackle the abusive behaviours 
that create  obstacles to the free movement of goods, peoples and capital. We note 
                                                
86 The same seems to be true also for the exclusion of import/export flows. 
87 We note that ETSO in its response to the EC Consultation Document on the Inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism (17 March 2009) clearly stated that merchant interconnectors 
should be excluded from the ITC (p.4). 
88 State aids, public procurement or taxation provisions could also be considered in this 
category but are irrelevant in our case. 
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that the jurisprudence of the European Courts has shown that competition rules are 
perfectly able to address these situations.89  
• While the Commission has extensively used the rules on free movement in the early 
days of energy liberalization,90 the use of competition law is now preferred, 
presumably for reasons of procedural economy. In fact, the Commission has powers 
under competition law (Art 9 of Regulation 1/2003) to negotiate commitments 
directly with dominant undertakings to rapidly address competition problems. In 
view of the recent ruling of the European Court of Justice in Alrosa91 (2010), which 
broadly supported the policy of the Commission on commitments, it can be assumed 
that the Commission will not change its strategy.92  
• The Treaty provisions governing free movement refer to measures the State must 
take. The interpretation of state is very broad and entails measures taken by national 
authorities. Ofgem, as an independent body which has been granted regulatory 
powers by national legislation fall within the scope of the provisions.93 From the 
Commission’s point of view, an infringement procedure against the British state for 
non-compliance with EU law is procedurally less efficient and politically probably 
more costly.94     
Therefore we will ask whether, in the light of the SvK (Svenska Kräftnet) jurisprudence, 
the imposition of the UK charging system on interconnectors could be considered as an 
                                                
89 e.g. Case 27/76 United Brands and related cases. Arguably the French initiative to take 
Article 3 EC out of the Lisbon Treaty, and thus eliminate competition as a core Treaty 
objective to put it instead in a protocol which relates to the internal market makes the case 
for  using  competition rules to achieve market integration even stronger. 
90 See e.g. C-159/94 Commission v. France, C-158/94 Commission v. Italy, C-157/94 Commission v. 
Netherlands. For comments see Blanchard, “French Electricity Sector: ECJ Decision on 
Monopolies for the Import and Export of Electricity”, 17(3) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law (1999), 265-280; Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets (2007), Oxford 
University Press; Gunst, “Energy Trade in the European Common Market – Free 
Movement, Exceptions and Regulatory Inaction”, 21 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources 
Law (2003), 447-469; O’Loughlin, “EC Competition Rules and Free Movement rules: An 
Examination of the Parallels and their Furtherance by the ECJ Wouters Decision”, 24(2) 
European Competition Law Review (2003), 62-69; Talus, “Role of the European Court of Justice 
in the Opening of Energy Markets”, 8 ERA Forum (2007), 1-14.  
91 C-441/07 P Alrosa. 
92 For more on the Commission practice regarding commitments and an assessment, see 
Hancher and Hauteclocque, “Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: the Current Dynamics 
of Regulatory Practice”, 11(3) Competition and Regulation in Network Industries (2010), 307-334. 
93 Following e.g. C-129/00 Commission v. Italy. See generally on this Craig, “Legal Control of 
Regulatory Bodies: Principle, Policy and Teleology”, in Birkinshaw and Varney (eds.), The 
European Legal Order After Lisbon (2010), Kluwer Law International, 93-116. 
94 We note that NGET could also be considered as an emanation of the British State 
(following Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas, Case C-103/88 Fratelli Constanzo SpA v. 
Commune di Milano) and thus be liable for damages in British Courts.  
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abuse of a dominant position by NGET under EU competition law. SvK was a very 
peculiar case but full of more general insights. As competition and free movement case 
law are increasingly converging,95 we will use both to support our analysis.  
We note that the reasoning in the SvK case was entirely based on EU competition law 
whereas the case could have also been addressed under EC Regulation 1228/2003 and the 
congestion management guidelines. Such approach indicates that the Commission may 
also be willing to use competition rules to solve problems related to non-compliance with 
the sector-specific legislation.  
In the SvK case, the industrial association of Danish energy companies Dansk Energi 
submitted to the Commission in June 2006 a complaint regarding an alleged abuse of 
dominant position by SvK on the Öresund interconnector linking Southern Sweden and 
Eastern Denmark. Later on, the Commission broadened the scope of the inquiry and 
included all interconnectors linked to the Swedish high voltage transmission grid. The 
argument was that SvK was curtailing transmission capacity on the Öresund 
interconnector to decrease costs linked to counter-trade and lower Swedish spot market 
prices. Dansk Energi argued that the curtailment led to the limitation of cross-border 
trade, hence to the creation of a barrier to internal market integration to the detriment of 
Eastern Danish consumers.  
The Commissions inquiry led to the following commitments by SvK: from 1 November 
2011, and for a period of 10 years SvK will subdivide the Swedish transmission system 
into two or more bidding zones. By 30 November 2011 the network will also be 
reinforced by building and operating a new 400kv line in the West-Coast-Corridor.  
This section follows step by step the analysis of the Commission decision of 14 April 
2010 in SvK and draws the parallel with the UK situation and NGET. It therefore 
analyzes the following: 
• Is NGET responsible, under the EU competition law, for the distorting effect of the 
UK charging system? 
• What is the relevant product and geographic market? 
• Is the UK charging system raising competition problems under the EU competition 
law? 
                                                
95 See e.g. Gyselen, “The Emerging Interface Between Competition Policy and 
Environmental Policy in the EC” in Cameron and May (eds.), Trade and Environment (1994), 
London; Mortelmans, “Towards Convergence in the Application of the Rules on Free 
Movement and on Competition?”, 38 Common Market Law Review (2001), 613-649; Schmidt, 
“Diagonal Competence Conflicts Between European Competition Law and National 
Regulation – a Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing”, 
European Review of Private Law (2000), 155. O’Keefe and Bavasso, “Four Freedoms, One 
Market and National Competence: In search of a Dividing Line”, in Liber Amicorum in Honour 
of Lord Slynn of Hadley (2000), The Hague.  
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• Are there acceptable ‘objective justifications’ for the UK charging system under EU 
competition law? 
 
4.1 Responsibility of SvK and NGET under the EU Competition Rules 
The first question is whether NGET can be held responsible under competition law. 
Looking at the SvK case, the fact that SvK is a state-owned central administrative 
authority that does not have legal personality did not hinder its qualification as an 
undertaking (and thus its responsibility) under EU competition rules. With reference to 
the Court’s case law the Commission stated that an entity engaged in economic activities 
is considered to be an undertaking in the meaning of Art 102 TFEU regardless of its legal 
status and the way it is financed.96 To support his argument, the Commission noted that 
SvK has the capacity to be an independent party to legal proceedings where a matter falls 
within its area of competence. It also enjoys considerable autonomy in practice. Given 
this extensive definition, NGET can be considered as an undertaking under EU 
competition law.  
The second question is to establish whether NGET bears responsibility for the specific 
practice under review. In the SvK case, the Commission established the responsibility of 
SvK in curtailing the interconnector capacity. Establishing responsibility was very easy to 
do as soon as it was established that SvK was independent from the Swedish state when 
taking operational decisions like interconnection management.  
NGET is much more independent from the British state than SvK was from the Swedish 
state.  An objection could however be raised in view of the fact that Ofgem regulates the 
charges imposed by NGET. In short, does the fact that Ofgem intervened shield NGET 
from antitrust liability when it collects network charges?  
In the Deutsche Telekom case, the Commission confirmed that EU competition rules 
could be enforced towards a dominant undertaking applying a previous decision of a 
national regulator if it left room for an abuse of dominant position. This was confirmed 
by the General Court and lately by the Court of Justice on 14 October 2010.97 The Court 
made clear that a decision of the national regulator cannot shelter the dominant 
undertaking from its responsibility on the basis of the principle of legitimate expectation, 
and that an undertaking as Deutsche Telekom (or NGET for that matter) would be 
considered responsible for the abusive charges as it is its responsibility to solicit a change 
of tariff to the regulator (something NGET has actually done for TNUoS charges). 
Lastly, The Court held in his judgment that the fact that the Commission could have 
started an infringement procedure against the German state (and thus the British state) 
under Art 260 TFEU98 does not limit the responsibility of Deutsche Telekom (and thus 
NGET) under competition rules. The responsibility of NGET is thus well established as 
regards the UK charging system.  
                                                
96 Case C-41 Höfner and Elser, Case C-280/06 ETI and Others, Case C-350/07 Kattner Stahlbau. 
97 Case-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission. 
98 See also C-6-9/90 Francovich. 
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4.2. Relevant Product and Geographic Market 
The Commission decision on the relevant market in SvK followed its usual practice, 
which reinforces our conclusion that an interconnector cannot be considered as a 
generator or consumer.  
In SvK, the relevant product market was defined as the (220-400kv) transmission grid 
including the interconnectors connected to it. This indeed follows the Commission’s 
jurisprudence where the electricity transmission market broadly includes transport of 
electricity between points of the high voltage grid.99 The fact that Britned is a merchant 
cable does not change that definition. 
The definition of the relevant geographic market has however been less straightforward. 
It includes two options: the geographic market is either the interconnector itself100 or the 
whole national TSO’s network including interconnectors, i.e. either only the cross-border 
transmission market (e.g. UK-Netherlands) or the whole transmission grid located on the 
national territory and borders.101 In both cases, the jurisprudence of the Commission 
shows that an interconnector cannot be considered as a producer or consumer. In SvK, 
the geographic market was considered as being the whole Swedish transmission grid 
including interconnectors.  
On this basis, the relevant market in a competition case investigating the charging system 
of NGET is likely to be the UK grid including all exempted interconnectors. In this case 
we would have several suppliers, NGET and the interconnectors, providing UK 
transmission services. It could be argued that each interconnector linked to the UK is a 
specific relevant market in its own right but this would not (directly) prevent NGET’s 
charging behaviour from having an impact on merchant interconnection investment 
incentives or on market prices in the UK and foreign wholesale and retail markets. The 
case where the Commission considered the interconnector as the relevant market in itself 
covered situations where it investigated whether long-term access rights on already 
amortized interconnectors were acceptable or whether the two parent companies of a joint 
venture could actually market the (exempted) interconnector capacity without colluding. 
This market definition would thus be used e.g. to investigate whether Britned markets its 
own capacities in full compliance with competition law. We note here that obtaining an 
exemption under Art 17 of Regulation 714/2009 (replacing Art 7 of Regulation 
1228/2003) does not shelter  the investors from EU competition scrutiny ex post. 102  
                                                
99 Following Case M.5154 CASC JV, Case M.4922 EMCC, Case M.3696 E.ON/MOL, Case 
M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP. 
100 UK-France interconnector - IP/01/341 of 12.3.2001, Case E-3/37.921 Viking Cable, Case 
M.5154 CASC JV, Case M.4922 EMCC. 
101 Case M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP, Case M.3696 E.ON/MOL, Case M.3696 E.ON/MOL, 
Case M.3440 EDP/ENI/GDP. 
102 For more on this see Hauteclocque and Rious, “Regulatory Uncertainty and Inefficiency 
for the Development of Merchant Lines in Europe: A Legal and Policy Discussion", in 
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However, the precise definition of the relevant market is not so consequential, insofar as 
it is well-established Court case law that a business conduct on one market having an 
anticompetitive effect on another market can also be considered as an abuse of a 
dominant position.103 As was highlighted in the preliminary assessment of the 
Commission in SvK (p.6):  
“the competitive analysis which concerns the transmission of electricity within 
Sweden and for exports to other Member States and Contracting Parties to the 
EEA Agreement does not depend on whether only one specific interconnector 
line or the national transmission grid is considered to be the relevant geographic 
market. Even when the interconnector is not owned or co-owned by the Swedish 
state or SvK, SvK can, in any event, control and thereby reduce the available 
capacity for this interconnector as the owner of the transmission grid in 
Sweden.” 
We believe it to be the same in the case of NGET. Being dominant (actually a quasi-
monopoly)104 on the UK transmission grid, the behaviour of NGET (its charging system 
on interconnectors) can have an influence on cross-border flows and on Britned’s 
profitability.  
We finally note that the relevant market would constitute a so-called ‘substantial part’ of 
the internal market, as the business practice under review has the potential to appreciably 
affect trade between Member States, which is a necessary condition for the case to fall 
under the jurisdiction of EU competition rules. From the case law, we indeed see that the 
impact of an abuse of dominant position on EU trade may be direct or indirect, actual or 
potential.105 Hence, the definition is very wide, and always includes cases involving 
interconnectors.106  
                                                                                                                                
Delvaux, Hunt and Talus (eds.), EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (2010), 2nd edition, Brussels: 
Euroconfidential, 163-182. 
103 See generally Case C-62/86 Akzo, Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak. See also all cases where an 
“essential” input on one market is needed for competition to develop on a related market 
(so-called vertical dominance cases).  
104 We note that the dominant position of SvK and NGET in the respective relevant markets 
is self-evident. As the Swedish state granted an exclusive concession to SvK to operate the 
electricity transmission network, SvK is a monopoly and therefore holds a dominant 
position on the electricity transmission network in Sweden. NGET also owns and operates 
the electricity transmission network in England and Wales (except a dozen of off-shore 
transmission grids managed by independent operators) and thus holds the same dominant 
position than SvK. It will entail the same related special responsibility not to impair 
competition.  
105 Case C-42/84 Remia BV and Others v. Commission; Case C-359/01P British Sugar v 
Commission. 
106 It is clear from the case law that no de minimis threshold exists in relation to the articles 
concerning free movement of goods. It means that a state measure can constitute a 
prohibited measure even if it is of relatively minor economic significance or if it is only 
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4.3 Practices Raising Concerns: Insights from the SvK Case for the Situation 
under Review in this Report 
The Svk case is all the more interesting in that it applies to a completely unbundled TSO 
with no interest in supply activities, like NGET and more and more European TSOs in 
the future. It shows that even ownership-unbundled TSOs can infringe competition rules. 
This situation represents, therefore, an entirely different scenario from the traditional one, 
that saw transmission networks as ‘essential facilities’ in the energy sector where abuses 
were linked to the existence of a vertically-integrated company favouring its affiliated 
supply arm in related markets.107  
The competition concern in SvK was that the Swedish TSO had curtailed capacity on the 
Swedish interconnectors when internal congestion problems on the national transmission 
system might arise. This behaviour would imply an abuse of dominant position, as 
curtailing interconnectors in these conditions would amount to: 
1. Discriminating between different network users: SvK treated (i) internal demand for 
transmission for the purpose of consumption and (ii) external demand for 
transmission for the purpose of export in a different way. For the Commission, 
internal demand was satisfied whenever capacity was available whereas external 
demand was refused despite availability during a substantial number of hours during 
the year. The Commission actually recalled: the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality is a fundamental principle of EU law (Art 18 TFEU). This 
principle in fact underlies the whole proceeding.108  
                                                                                                                                
applicable on a very limited geographical part of the national territory, see Case C-67/97 
Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033. Conversely, in case of competition rules a de minimis threshold 
does apply (see the Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably 
restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty (de minimis), O.J. 22.12.2001, C 
368/13), but generally not to a practice so inherently linked to cross-border trade. However 
we saw in (Case M.2947) Verbund/Energie Allianz in 2003, concerning Austria, that little 
weight was given to the cross-border tariff, of 0.5 euros/MWh, to be paid for transmission 
of electricity between Germany and Austria. Because of the specific features of the Austrian 
market, the Commission held that this tariff acted as a barrier to entry “only to a limited extent”, 
which shows that the magnitude of the restraint should be taken into account, at least under 
competition rules. 
107 On the case law on “essential facilities” in energy, see Kotlowski, “Access Rights to 
European Energy Networks – A Construction Site Revisited”,  in Delvaux, Hunt and Talus 
(eds.), EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (2010), 2nd edition, Brussels: Euroconfidential, 87-118; 
Hauteclocque, Marty and Pillot, “The Essential Facilities Doctrine in European Competition 
Policy: The Case of the Energy Markets”, in Glachant, Finon and Hauteclocque (eds.), 
Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets:  A New Perspective (forthcoming 2011), Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
108 See generally on the case law regarding discrimination: Bernard “Discrimination and Free 
Movement in EC Law”, 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996), 82-108. 
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The Court used the criterion of discrimination to back Art 102 TFEU proceedings in 
many instances. Since market integration is one of the core objectives of the EU 
Treaty, every State or firm behaviour that has as its object or effect the fragmentation 
of markets is likely to be caught by Art 102 TFEU. As summarized by the 
Commission in its SvK decision, the Court has used such reasoning in two categories 
of competition cases: (a) straightforward discrimination on ground of nationality by a 
dominant undertaking,109 (b) discrimination taking the form of applying dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions.110 In the second case, the measure has a 
discriminatory effect, but not necessarily on grounds of nationality. Discrimination 
can thus also arise when a measure results in a disadvantage for a portion of domestic 
market players compared to other domestic or foreign market players.111 Of course, 
an ‘internal market’ dimension still needs to be established. 
Looking at the free movement of goods case law, it appears unclear whether 
discrimination on grounds of nationality (reinforced by a protectionist intent or 
effect112) is necessary for a prohibition, or if inequality between market players 
creating trade restraints is sufficient. We believe that the second interpretation should 
be favoured as tackling ‘apparently’ non-discriminatory measures, which 
nevertheless restrict cross-border trade, is necessary to achieve the Treaty goals of 
free movement.113 This difference between discrimination and inequality as the 
definite test for prohibition under the free movement rules is however, irrelevant 
under EU competition law.114               
2. Solving an internal problem to the detriment of the completion of the internal market: 
SvK has artificially segmented the internal market and hence prevented foreign 
industrial and other users to benefit from the single market. Indeed, SvK artificially 
maintained low prices in Sweden and high prices in Denmark. The fact that a conduct 
on one market (transmission in Sweden) creates anti-competitive trade restriction on 
another market (wholesale in neighbouring countries or wholesale in Sweden) is a 
typical abuse of dominance covered by EU competition law. 
To sum up: in the first line of reasoning discrimination/inequality between market players 
is emphasized. As a complement, the second line addresses the choice of the dominant 
                                                
109 Case T-139/98 AAMS, Case 7/82 GVL. 
110 Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries, Case C-163/99 Portuguese Republic v Commission, Case C-
82/01 Aéroports de Paris. 
111 Davies, “Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic Rationality of Different 
Conceptions of Free Movement Law”, 11 German Law Journal (2010), 671.  
112 This is the interpretation of the Court e.g. in Joined Cases C-267-8/91 Keck & Mithouard. 
113 Supporting this interpretation, see Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy and the opinion of 
the Advocate General in Case C-412/93 Leclerc and Case C-110/05 Commission v. Italy. We 
note that with the other freedoms (establishment, services),113 the principle of equality 
among all market participants replaced discrimination on grounds of nationality (See e.g. 
Case C-55/94 Gebhard, Case C-369-76/96 Arblade, Case C-415 Bosman). 
114 More on this below.  
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company to favour its own interests to the detriment of the single market. How could this 
be applied to the situation of NGET?  
1. Discriminating between different network users:115 At first glance, the NGET 
situation does not fit easily in this first line of reasoning. NGET indeed imposes the 
same charges on all UK network users (assuming interconnectors are users). It is thus 
more a case of inequality than discrimination. 
The essence of the discrimination prohibition under Art 102 TFEU is that dominant 
firms have a special responsibility to ensure a fair competitive process among 
customers on downstream markets.116 The prohibition of discrimination therefore 
requires that comparable situations are not treated differently unless such difference 
in treatment is objectively justified.117 Conversely, different situations must be treated 
differently, in particular if a similarity of treatment damages these customers on the 
markets in which they operate. Indeed, it is the very fact that a measure affects some 
market participants more negatively than others, and therefore changes their relative 
competitive positions, which makes market access harder for disadvantaged parties 
and creates indirect discrimination.118 The question then is to demonstrate whether (i) 
the UK charging system ensures a fair competitive process on downstream markets 
(wholesale markets in UK and the Netherlands) and (ii) some customers (here 
importers/exporters) of UK transmission services suffer from competitive harm. 
In the case of the UK charging system, TNUoS and BSUoS charges are apparently 
equally applied. However it is the actual effect which matters. Our economic analysis 
has shown that by creating pancaking situations, both TNUoS and BNUoS charges 
disadvantage market players involved in cross-border flows (essentially UK to 
Netherlands). The system thus (i) distorts competitive conditions on related 
downstream markets and (ii) creates competitive harm and loss of welfare, in 
particular to customers in the Netherlands.  
We also recall that the Union since the beginning of liberalization has put the 
emphasis on increasing cross-border trade, not only by tackling exclusive 
                                                
115 In order to use the discrimination argument against NGET, the relevant market would 
have to be defined as the UK grid including interconnectors. If it is defined otherwise, abuse 
would have to be grounded as in point 2 and 3 of the analysis below.  
116 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche, Case C-322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin. 
See also Behrens, “Controlling Dominance or Protecting Competition: From Individual 
Abuses to Responsibility for Competition” in Ullrich (ed.), The Evolution of European 
Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition? (Edward Elgar, 2006), 224-232 and M. 
van der Woude, “Article 82 EC – Abuse of a dominant position”, in Jones (ed.), EU Energy 
Law (Volume II): EU Competition Law and Energy Markets (2007), 2nd ed., Claeys & Casteels, 
Brussels.  
117 Case C-280/93 Germany v Council. 
118 We note that the Court still uses a presumption of equal burden for these “apparently” 
non-discriminatory measures. It is thus upon the claimant to prove the restricting effect on 
market access.  
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import/export monopolies119 and long-term priority access rights signed before 
liberalization,120 but also by outlawing distance-related tariffs121 and providing for the 
creation of an inter-TSO mechanism.122 By hindering the continuous effort of the 
Union to create a right to any customer or producer of the Union to access a truly 
European grid, NGET does not fulfil its responsibility vis-à-vis the competitive 
process and undermines the effectiveness of the Union system for access to 
networks.123 The fact that TNUoS and BNUoS charges complicate the 
implementation of market integration trade platforms would fit generally in this line 
of reasoning. We also note that in several competition cases, the Commission already 
had the opportunity to say that flat transfer charges for cross-border flows were 
generally arbitrary, discriminatory, anti-competitive and not cost-reflective.124 In this 
perspective, it is fairly straightforward to argue that NGET creates discrimination or 
inequality and thus abuses its dominant position when it imposes TNUoS charges on 
interconnectors.   
2. Solving an internal problem to the detriment of the completion of the internal market: 
The NGET case fits more easily in this second line of reasoning where discrimination 
does not have to be established. The SvK case served to establish three basic criteria 
to be fulfilled to ground a competition offence in cases where domestic goals conflict 
with market integration: (i) the company under scrutiny must be dominant, (ii) the 
dominant company must engage in the practice under review with a view to achieve 
domestic goals, be they for its own benefit or for the benefit of its own nationals; (iii) 
the practice under review must have an impact on the creation of a true single market 
in energy.  
SvK is the dominant undertaking on the relevant market and therefore has a special 
responsibility for not impairing the completion of the single market. The practice 
under review has a clear internal purpose, alleviating internal congestions and thus 
reducing costs, and this is clearly to the detriment of foreign customers and free trade 
                                                
119 E.g. Case IV/32.732 Ijsselcentrale and cases cited supra note 91. 
120 See European Commission, Role of interconnectors in the electricity market. A competition 
perspective: MEMO/01/76 of 13.3.2001, and the cases cited supra note 101.  
121 See Regulation 1228/2003. 
122 For a full analysis of the developments in this field, see Hauteclocque and Talus, 
“Capacity to Compete: Recent Trends in Access Regimes in Electricity and Natural Gas 
Networks”, in Delvaux, Hunt and Talus (eds.), EU Energy Law and Policy Issues III (forthcoming 
2011), Euroconfidential, Brussels. 
123 It is interesting to recall that in the Bussone case (Case 31/78 Francesco Bussone v. Italian 
Ministry of Agriculture), the Court held that the adoption of the national rule under review was 
illegal only because it could hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially the 
effectiveness of the Union system.  
124 See the Case M.1673 VEBA/VIAG and Case Verbandevereinbarung, Report on 
Competition Policy (1998), 156-159; see also the analysis of the latter case in Albert, “Energy 
Liberalization and EC Competition Law”, 25 Fordham International Law Journal (2001), 909-
945. 
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within the internal market. The competition offence was thus well grounded in this 
case. 
The application of the SvK jurisprudence on the UK charging system for backing a 
possible offence is fairly straightforward. NGET, the dominant company on the 
relevant market, is imposing charges on interconnector users for cost recovery – an 
internal purpose – to the detriment of free trade within the internal market 
(pancaking).125 As shown in the economic section, charges imposed by NGET indeed 
do reduce cross-border trade by lowering the range of efficient cross-border 
transactions and increasing the cost of market coupling implementation. As a result, 
the behaviour of NGET on the UK transmission market has an anti-competitive 
impact on the UK (and foreign) wholesale and retail markets.126 A competition 
concern acceptable under EU competition law thus also exists in this case.   
3. Other possible competition offences: other competition offences not strictly related to 
the SvK case could probably be investigated by a competition authority. In particular, 
the effect on other market players’ incentives to invest in interconnectors is 
interesting to our analysis. If the relevant market is the UK transmission grid 
including all interconnectors, it could indeed be argued that NGET by imposing 
charges on interconnectors and interconnector users creates barriers to new entry in 
the supply of UK transmission services.127 As we have seen in our economic analysis, 
the UK charging system creates disincentives to invest in interconnectors by 
hindering the business case of new (merchant) interconnectors, i.e. complicating 
entry in a part of the relevant market. Raising barriers to entry is a competition 
offence, in particular for a “super-dominant”128 undertaking. In addition, as NGET 
also invests in merchant interconnectors (and thus gets part of its money back 
through the charging system), it might also be considered as an exploitative 
behaviour.129  
We note that this type of analysis is not unfamiliar to the SvK case. In this case, it is 
also interesting to see how the Commission justifies the adequacy of the 
                                                
125 This of course also applies to TNUoS charges.  
126 We note that cross-border charges had also been analyzed by the Commission as a barrier 
to entry in a gas case (Case M.931 NESTE/IVO). 
127 By extension, in case all possible cross-border transmission markets were separate 
relevant markets (e.g. UK-Netherlands, UK-Ireland, UK-Norway, etc.) it could also be 
argued that the NGET charging system has an exclusionary or pre-emptive (NGET keeps 
the option to invest later) effect.  
128 As defined by Advocate General Fennelly in Case C-395/96P and C-396/96P Compagnie 
Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others; see also Case C-1/36.915 Deutsche Post AG – 
Interception of cross border mail. 
129 We note generally that allowing regulated TSOs to invest in merchant interconnectors 
leads to potentially severe anti-competitive effects and inefficiencies. On this, see 
Hauteclocque and Rious, “Reconsidering the Regulation of Merchant Transmission 
Investment in the Light of the Third Energy Package: The Role of Dominant Generators”, 
EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2009/59.   
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commitments it accepts (the creation of bidding zones) as it spells out clearly all 
competition concerns the commitments must address. Bidding zones are generally 
intended to prevent a distortion of price signals and to reflect market conditions. In 
particular, they are intended to give important investment signals for both new grid 
investments and new generation capacity that will lead to price convergence between 
the zones in the long run. In the SvK case, the Commission makes clear that a 
dominant undertaking distorting investment signals for grid investment (including 
interconnectors) and thereby hindering price convergence might be responsible of a 
competition offence. This line of reasoning could work also in the UK case.  
 
4. 4. ‘Objective Justifications’  
Here we discuss whether the UK charging system might be considered objectively 
justified under EU competition law despite its negative effect on single market 
integration. Objective justifications can be economic or non-economic in nature. 
 
4.4.1. Economic Justifications 
Objective justifications are generally of an economic nature in competition cases, even 
though reasons of wider public interest are also considered from time to time.130 Under 
Art 101 TFEU, the EU primary provision addressing cartels, the balancing of anti-
competitive effects and objective justifications (generally referred to as ‘efficiencies’) is 
current practice. This is, however, not very often the rule in practice under Art 102 TFEU 
due to the special responsibility of dominant companies vis-à-vis the competitive process 
and the internal market. If in theory a dominant company can submit objective 
justifications, this is only rarely accepted by the Court.131 Accordingly, the analysis of 
objective justifications is the shortest part in the competition analysis of the Commission 
in the SvK case.  
The existence of a real balancing assessment between anti-competitive effects and 
efficiencies in more traditional abuse of dominant position cases with a “purer” antitrust 
rationale is largely theoretical. We can therefore hardly foresee that it will be carried out 
in a competition case where the competition offence is a breach of one of the most 
fundamental principle of the European Union, i.e. single market integration.132 The Court 
                                                
130 See generally e.g. Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy”, 39 Common Market Law Review 
(2002), 1057-1099.  
131 See the argument by Temple Lang and O’Donogue in “The Concept of a Exclusionary 
Abuse under Art 82”, Working Paper (2005), Global Competition Law Center on “objective 
justification”: “This issue deserves serious consideration, since a defense that is recognised in theory, but not 
in practice, is the same as no defence.” See generally Loewenthal, “The Defense of “Objective 
Justification” in the Application of Article 82 EC”, 28(4) World Competition (2005), 461-463. 
132 To the opposite we note that, since Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, the Court is trying to 
reach a balance between prohibition and exceptions (the so-called “rule of reason” 
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has indeed clearly stated that quantitative restraints to exports (i.e. any measures having 
equivalent effects to state taxes on imports/exports133 – Art 30 TFUE) by a dominant 
undertaking amounts to a restriction by object under the competition rules.134 This means 
that there is no need to quantify the effect on market integration to state that there is 
indeed an abuse. It is also well established under Art 101 TFEU that practices hindering 
the fundamental objective of market integration such as market partitioning clauses in 
supply/transport contracts are almost never accepted, which also amounts to a quasi per 
se prohibition.135  
If we assume that the Commission or the Court would truly carry out a balancing exercise 
between the internal (economic) benefits for the dominant firm and the magnitude of the 
damage to market integration under competition rules than the four criteria of Art 101(3) 
TFEU should at least be fulfilled as conditions are likely to be substantially more 
restrictive for a dominant company. These criteria136 state that the behaviour under 
review should (i) substantially improve economic efficiency, (ii) give a fair share of 
benefits to final consumers, (iii) be indispensable or at least proportional to the 
achievement of the efficiency gains and (iv) not afford contracting parties the possibility 
of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
Objective factors out of the control of the company such as public service obligations 
may also be taken into account and will be analyzed later.  
The first criterion indicates that the UK charging system must create significant 
efficiency gains and that a causal link between the achievement of the claimed efficiency 
and the restrictive practice must be clearly established. As we saw, the UK charging 
system cannot be directly linked to all costs incurred (e.g. internal congestion costs): it is 
                                                                                                                                
exceptions) in the free movement of goods case law (see below). It is also true for the 
freedoms of establishment (Case C-55/94 Gebhard) and services (Case C-3/95 Broede).   
133 In Case C-120/78 Cassis de Dijon, the Court stated that “all trading rules enacted by Member 
States which are capable of hindering directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are 
to be considered as measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions”. See also e.g. C-2-
3/62 Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg, Case 8/74 Dassonville, Case T-115/94 Opel Austria 
v. Council. Measures of equivalent effects to an export/import tax do not have to be collected 
by the state or redirected to it. They do not even have to create discrimination or concern a 
good that would be in direct competition to a local good. It just has to be a sum of money, 
however small, imposed by the very fact that a good crosses a frontier within the internal 
market. It therefore seems likely that TNUoS and BNUoS charges imposed on 
interconnections and interconnector users will be considered as measures having equivalent 
effect to cross-border quantitative restraints. We however note that the Cassis de Dijon 
decision has been widely criticized for going too far and that the subsequent cases have not 
always been consistent.    
134 Case 58-64 Consten and Grundig. 
135 The Court therefore seems less willing to consider justifications under competition rules 
than under free movement rules, probably because state measures generally have a stronger 
“public interest” component.  
136 We note that the four criteria should all be fulfilled, they are thus not mutually exclusive. 
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not clear whether import/export flows increase fixed and variable costs of NGET. 
Compensation, as it is now organized, does not “contribute to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress”.137 In the past, 
the two main efficiency gains recognized so far by the Commission in energy have been 
investment and entry.138 Internal benefits of UK charges seem to be very weak139. 
Moreover, as we saw, UK charges distort interconnector investment incentives and 
hinder cross-border trade, thereby limiting entry. Criterion (i) is therefore far from being 
fulfilled.  
We can also wonder whether protecting the competitiveness of UK generators in their 
home country could be considered as an efficiency. It has indeed been argued during the 
NGET consultation on TNUoS charges that the removal of charges from interconnectors 
would be detrimental to the competitiveness of UK generators vis-à-vis foreign 
generators on the domestic market, and that it could even lead to the relocation abroad of 
certain UK generators. Similar concerns had been expressed by respondents to the market 
test of the SvK case. It had been argued that the introduction of bidding zones will raise 
industrial prices in the south of Sweden and will affect their ability to compete on their 
own markets. The Commission made clear that this was not an acceptable justification to 
the behaviour of SvK as European industrial consumers also face unfair competition from 
Swedish industrial consumers benefiting from electricity prices which do not reflect 
market prices. As a result, restoring fair competition across the single market here means 
creating a level playing field for industrial customers in the whole Union. In the light of 
the SvK case, protecting the UK market from the risk of relocation abroad cannot be 
considered an objective justification.       
As regards the second criterion, we note that even under Art 102 TFEU objective 
justifications had generally to be justified in terms of efficiencies and consumer 
interests.140 As concerns customer interest, we fail to see a clear benefit of the UK 
charging system, except as concerns cheaper prices for UK consumers to the detriment of 
Dutch customers.  
The third criterion addresses the problem of the proportionality and of the necessity of 
these charges.141 As regards proportionality, cost-reflectivity is the key factor. We note 
that Regulation 714/2009 clearly states that as a general principle mutual compensation is 
acceptable but should be cost-reflective to avoid creating artificial barriers to entry.  
                                                
137 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, O.J. 27.4.2004, 
C 101/97. The Commission guidelines also note that “cost savings that arise from the mere 
exercise of market power by the parties cannot be taken into account”.  
138 E.g. Synergen: Report on Competition Policy 2002, IP/02/792 of 31.5.2002; Case C-37.966 
Distrigaz. 
139 Cf. note 25. 
140 Case C-95/04P – British Airways.  
141 We also find in the free movement case law these criteria of proportionality and so-called 
“alternative means”, i.e that where there is another measure  which is less restrictive of trade, 
the first measure would be neglected .   
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Our economic analysis has shown that there is no evidence that the existing charges 
compensate NGET for the right amount or that additional export/import flows actually do 
create any additional fixed and variable costs to NGET depending on the circumstances. 
In theory, a justification of the distorting measure could be that it in fact corrects a market 
failure or an externality. In our case, the externality could be the additional congestions 
created. However, our economic analysis has shown that UK charges are not clearly 
implemented for this purpose and do not give efficient signal to cross-border transactions. 
In a nutshell, there is no reason to believe that TNUoS and BSUoS charges would pass 
the proportionality test.  
As regards necessity, the objective is to demonstrate that these charges are the most 
efficient way, amongst other alternatives, to solve the problem of the dominant 
incumbent. In the SvK case for instance, it is likely that if curtailment had clearly been 
the most efficient solution and it had been transparently reported and discussed with the 
national regulatory authority, it would have been acceptable under the competition rules, 
at least in the short term. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the new draft 
ERGEG framework guidelines for capacity allocation and congestion management in 
electricity142 explicitly acknowledge it. Even if we can assume that the transparency 
requirement is fulfilled for NGET, as Ofgem reviews and approves the charging system, 
we are not aware of any comparative assessment carried out in partnership with Ofgem 
showing that TNUoS and BNUoS charges are the best way to obtain compensation. It 
therefore appears that these charges would also fail the necessity test.  
As regards the fourth factor, it is hard to quantify the percentage of competition that 
would be eliminated. Our economic analysis has however shown that the restraint is 
potentially very significant. We roughly calculated that the loss of welfare only due to 
inefficient trade could be of 60 M€/year, and that it could be considerably higher if we 
consider the competition effect of cross-border trade (see box 1). 
Overall, we cannot see how the UK charging system on interconnectors could be 
objectively justified, at least on economic grounds. 
 
4.4.2 Non-Economic Justifications 
The question remains whether there are acceptable non-economic justifications (e.g. 
social policy, environment, security of supply). In our case security of energy supply, 
meaning network reliability (for BSUoS) and network investment (for TNUoS) could 
provide for justification. NGET could argue that there is the need to recover its total costs 
in order to suitably ensure short-term security of supply. The case for invoking a ‘security 
of supply’ argument seems however very weak in the case of UK charges on 
interconnectors. Moreover, non-economic benefits are generally seldom taken into 
account in competition cases. Even long-term gas import contracts are not sure to be 
                                                
142 ERGEG, Draft Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for 
Electricity, E10-ENM-20-03, September 2010.  
 
 
The UK Charging System on Interconnectors 
Florence School of Regulation 
 
 
66 
accepted on the basis of a ‘security of supply’ argument.143 Remarkably, even when the 
public interest (e.g. strategic use of domestic natural resources144) was much more clearly 
at stake, the Court in recent cases145 gave more prominence to free 
movement/competition arguments.146  
Yet, non-economic justifications also play a key role in the area of free movement, albeit 
in a different guise:147 the so-called “mandatory requirements of general interest” 
exemption may be invoked in respect of measures which apply without distinction to 
national products and products from other Member States.148 As seen, this is the case for 
the UK charging system. However, demonstrating that the conditions for this exemption 
are fulfilled is difficult. It must be demonstrated that ‘in the absence of the measure under 
review, there would be a serious and foreseeable risk that the non-economic benefit 
pursued would not be achieved’.149 It can hardly be argued that the absence of UK 
charges on interconnectors would “seriously undermine” security of supply in the UK.  
Lastly, NGET, if considered ‘an undertaking entrusted with a public service obligation 
regarding security of supply’ could obtain an exemption under Art 106(2) TFEU150 from 
the competition and free movement rules. As certified TSO, NGET is indeed entrusted 
with the operation of many services of general economic interest (see Art 3, 12 and 15 of 
Directive 2009/72/EC), to which security of supply belongs.151 There are four 
requirements to be exempted under Art 106(2) TFEU: (i) the undertaking must have been 
given a specific task, (ii) the task must have been granted by the state pursuant to a 
measure of the public authorities, i.e. a public act, (iii) the task in question can only be 
                                                
143 Even though the series of cases involving dominant exporters (Gazprom, etc.) evidenced 
the influence of non-economic elements in the analysis, see for instance Talus, “Long-term 
Gas Agreements and Security of Supply – Between Law and Politics”, 32(4) European Law 
Review (2007), 535-548. 
144 Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd. 
145 E.g. Case C-196/07 CNE, Case C-207/07 Endesa, Case C-206/06 Essent, Case C-439/06 
Citiworks.  
146 E.g. Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd; Case C-347/88 Commission v. Hellenic Republic.  
147 Purely economic benefits are not acceptable as justification and non-economic benefits 
are the norm, see for instance Case C-158/96 Kohll: “aims of “purely” economic nature cannot 
justify a barrier to the fundamental principle of freedom to provide services”.  
148 Keck 
149 In Kohll, the Court stated that “the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the social 
security system constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier of this 
kind”. See note above. 
150 As a “privileged undertaking”, NGET shall “be subject to the rules contained in the 
Treaty in so far as the application of those rules does not obstruct the performance in law or 
in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be 
affected contrary to the public interest”. 
151 This argument was made in Case 91/50 Ijsselcentrale, Case C-158/94 Commission v. Italy, 
Case C-393/94 Almelo. 
 
 
The UK Charging System on Interconnectors 
Florence School of Regulation 
 
 
67 
performed under acceptable economic conditions152 if the relevant Treaty Articles are not 
applied and (iv) the Union interest must not be adversely affected.153 Conditions (i) and 
(ii) are easily fulfilled: the British state entrusts NGET with security of supply obligations 
and Ofgem publicly grants an exclusive right to impose charges. Condition (iii) is the 
competition law version of the proportionality test analyzed above,154 and we saw that the 
existing charging system does not fulfil it. Condition (iv) interestingly imposes that the 
Union interest is not negatively affected by the measure. Here again the charging system 
clearly fails the test as it creates pancaking, discrimination and it does not tackle the 
compensation and harmonization problems in the interest of the Union.    
To conclude: The case law is somehow ambiguous on whether or not per se prohibitions 
exist under Art 102 TFEU for business practices hindering single market integration. 
However, in all likelihood ‘objective justifications’ with a weak economic or non-
economic rationale, as it is the case for the UK charging system, could not shield NGET 
from antitrust liability. The analysis pursued under alternative EU legal basis yields the 
same result.    
 
General Conclusions 
The UK charging system as applied on interconnectors is both detrimental to the 
integration of the single market in electricity and not in compliance with EU law. We 
summarize our findings against the relevant objectives specified in SLC C5(5) of 
NGET’s electricity transmission license and its statutory duties. 
SLC C5(5)(a) – Facilitates effective competition in the generation and supply of 
electricity and facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of 
electricity 
UK network charges as unilaterally implemented by NGET create pancaking problems 
and cross-border inefficiencies. Their imposition leads to a limitation of competition in 
the internal market, restrict efficient cross-border transactions and increases 
implementation costs on market integration.  
Compensation and harmonization issues naturally call for comprehensive and EU-wide 
solutions. From an economic point of view, unsolved issues should be tackled by 
improving current EU instruments and not by charging cross-border transactions. 
 
                                                
152 Case C-C-320/91 Corbeau. 
153 Hancher, “Article 86: Special and Exclusive Rights”, in Jones (ed.), EU Energy Law 
(Volume II): EU Competition Law and Energy Markets (2007), 2nd ed., Claeys & Casteels, 
Brussels.  
154 As noted by Hancher (ibid), the Art 106(2) TFEU test is wider than the pure free 
movement test as it accommodates economic justification.  
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SLC C5(5)(b) – Costs reflectivity – charges which reflect, as far as reasonably 
practicable, the costs incurred 
UK network charges on interconnectors are, in general, not cost reflective with respect to 
cross-border interconnector users and create several inefficiencies. The reason for this is 
threefold.  
Firstly, UK network charges create pancaking problems which is making certain cross-
border network users pay twice for the same service. This is the case for instance of 
Dutch consumers who should have to pay for the network twice if they import energy 
from the UK. 
Secondly, UK network charges are not cost reflective because they are not properly 
implemented. Indeed the charges applied to interconnector users do not correspond 
directly to the real costs created by the cross-border flow. This is the case for instance of 
BSUoS charges which are not reflective of internal congestion costs created by 
interconnector flows.  
Thirdly, the existing charging system implemented unilaterally by NGET is not cost 
reflective with respect of compensation and harmonization problems. It creates automatic 
compensation even when compensation is not needed. When compensation is needed, 
charges are usually not cost-reflective.  
 
 
 
SLC C5(5)(c) – Properly taking account of developments in the transmission system 
Finally UK network charges on interconnectors do not properly take into account the 
development in the transmission system. These charges create distortion of 
interconnection investment incentives. Indeed, UK charges lower the economic interest 
that investors and, more broadly, the EU community have in the interconnector, possibly 
to a point where the project would no longer be profitable. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – EU ITC History 
The 2002 voluntary ITC scheme was one of the early agreements reached within the 
Florence Forum in 2000. It however was not followed by prompt implementation. It was 
meant to be a transitory solution to replace transaction-based cross-border tariffs and to 
overcome tariff pancaking. 
The first compensation scheme, called at that time cross-border transfer (CBT) 
mechanism, included nine participating countries (87 TWh and involved a fund of 200 
M€). It allowed suppression of several cross-border transaction tariffs and pancaking 
problems. In fact, a year before, in 2001, every country had enforced its own cross-border 
transmission tariff and imports, exports or transits of energy though a power system 
which used to be charged for the use of every national network. 
Between 2004 and 2006, difficulties with obtaining and evaluating real network flow data 
delayed the development of an agreed methodology to measure and compensate cross-
border flow costs in a manner consistent with the Regulation’s requirement that costs are 
based on Long Run Average Incremental Costs (“LRAIC”). By the end of 2006, ITC 
Guidelines had not been submitted to the EC’s Comitology process. ERGEG did not 
submit formal advice to the EC. This delay prevented the EC to proceed with a 
mandatory ITC scheme. 
In the absence of agreement, ERGEG advised that until an agreed methodology was 
established it should be the responsibility of ETSO to reach an agreement on the choice 
of method to be adopted in any interim period. ERGEG advised that ETSO should 
indicate its formal position on its preferred choice with respect to the methodology it 
intends to pursue with respect to both the interim period and for the longer terms, subject 
to the approval of the national regulators.  
In light of ERGEG’s advice, ETSO developed a proposal to apply for the years 2008 and 
2009 that was again based on a voluntary approach. (To tackle the participation issue, 
ETSO’s public position on the continuation of a voluntary arrangement was that the 
voluntary mechanism could only proceed with the inclusion of all its members. The terms 
of the circulated agreement contained a clause requiring all signatories to confirm the 
support of their national regulators for the inclusions of the costs within the scheme 
within their national tariff mechanisms. The effect of this clause was that if one or more 
TSO did not receive the support of their national regulators for their participation in the 
scheme, then the scheme would become null and void for all signatories. The implication 
was that only with full participation could ETSO, ERGEG and the EC be confident of 
progressing mandatory ITC Guidelines for implementation from 2010.) 
This agreement for the years 2008 and 2009 ended on 31 December 2009. In December 
2009, TSOs reached a new agreement for an interim solution to be enforced until the 
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official EC guidelines for ITC compensation were adopted during the year 2010. In the 
same month, a draft regulation was published. 
 
Appendix 2 – Details of ITC Mechanism 
The ITC mechanism proceeds in three steps. First, the total “fund” available to ITC 
parties, is calculated, both for losses compensation and for compensation for provision of 
infrastructure. Second, the compensation (cost claims) for each TSO whose system is 
used to host transit flows. Third, the mechanism establishes the contribution (cost 
payments) to be paid by ITC entities to reflect their responsibility in inducing transit 
flows in other grids by participating ITC parties. Finally, based on agreed principles for 
compensation and contribution, an ex-ante net financial result is calculated for each party 
to determine the level of payment to (or receipt from) the ITC fund based on the net flow 
across a country’s network.  
 
The Size of Compensation Fund 
The first step is to calculate the total amount of the compensation fund. Regulation (EC) 
No 713/2009 established the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators. 
According to Regulation (EC) No 838/2010, this agency is required to make a proposal 
on the total amount required for the fund for infrastructure provision compensation, 
which we subsequently refer to as CF. This amount should be based on a EU assessment 
of the infrastructure of electricity transmission associated with facilitating cross-border 
flows of electricity. 
 
The Individual Claiming of the Compensation Fund 
 
The total amount is then split between TSOs proportionally, depending on: the TSO’s 
transit and load factors. 
The TSO’s transit factor, which is defined as the transit in the national transmission 
system as a proportion of total transit in all transmission systems. Transit is defined by 
the formula min(export, import), on an hourly basis and aggregated on an annual basis, 
i.e. the hourly transit is the minimum between the total hourly flow in the import 
direction and the total hourly flow in the export direction. The transit factor is the ratio of 
a TSO’s transit relative to the aggregated transit of all participating TSOs and is given by 
the following formula: . 
 
The TSO’s load factors, which is the square of transits of electricity, in proportion to load 
and transits in that national transmission system relative to the square of transits of 
electricity in proportion to the load and transit for all national transmission systems. The 
transit load factor is given by the following formula: 
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                       Cost claimed:  
 
The Individual Contribution to the Compensation Fund 
The contribution to the ITC fund by each TSO is calculated in proportion to the absolute 
value of the net flows into and from their national transmission as a share of the absolute 
vale of the net flows into and from all national transmission systems. For each Member 
State, the cumulated absolute net flow (CANF) should be calculated for the relevant 
period according to the formula: 
               
being the measured flows on interconnections respectively in export direction 
and import direction, during hour t.  
Each Member State is supposed to contribute to the compensation fund on the basis of its 
CANF. The compensation to be paid by Member State is therefore given by the formula: 
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Appendix 3 – Harmonization in the EU 
 
Source: ENTSO (2010) 
